

IN VIEW OF CURRENT AND FUTURE FISCAL RESTRAINTS AND THE NEED
FOR EFFICIENCY AND JOINT OPERATIONS, WHAT IS THE ARMY'S
PRIMARY ROLE IN DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES
DURING HOMELAND DISASTER AND EMERGENCY EVENTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2013-02

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 13-12-2013		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) FEB 2013 – DEC 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE In View of Current and Future Fiscal Restraints and the need for Efficiency and Joint Operations, what is the Army's Primary Role in Defense Support to Civil Authorities during Homeland Disaster and Emergency Events				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Ayokunle O. Oladipofaniyi				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This research discusses the challenges of providing a timely distribution of supplies and support during disaster relief operations that lack designated national stakeholders and systems. Historical lessons learned from past disaster relief operations reveal that similar trends existed. The creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) were essential in driving towards a more responsive federal approach to disaster relief operations. The lessons learned from the catastrophic Hurricane Katrina gave rise to what we witness today as the improved interoperability between the key stakeholders in disaster relief operations. Although there is improved interoperability, the ability of FEMA and NORTHCOM to gain a common operating picture continues to hamper operations. As a result, this research recommends revisions of the federal disaster declaration process as it relates to the use of Title 10 forces; improvement to FEMA's current operating procedures; perfecting NORTHCOM's employment of its military assets; and developing better relations with other disaster relief stakeholders.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Situational Awareness; Unity of Command and Unity; Interoperation between NORTHCOM and FEMA; and Common operating picture on the availability of assets, location of distribution centers, and support personnel					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	120	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Thesis Title: In View of Current and Future Fiscal Restraints and the need for Efficiency and Joint Operations, what is the Army's Primary Role in Defense Support to Civil Authorities during Homeland Disaster and Emergency Events

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

IN VIEW OF CURRENT AND FUTURE FISCAL RESTRAINTS AND THE NEED FOR EFFICIENCY AND JOINT OPERATIONS, WHAT IS THE ARMY'S PRIMARY ROLE IN DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES DURING HOMELAND DISASTER AND EMERGENCY EVENTS, by Major Ayo O. Oladipofaniyi, 120 pages

This research discusses the challenges of providing a timely distribution of supplies and support during disaster relief operations that lack designated national stakeholders and systems. Historical lessons learned from past disaster relief operations reveal that similar trends existed. The creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) were essential in driving towards a more responsive federal approach to disaster relief operations.

The lessons learned from the catastrophic Hurricane Katrina gave rise to what we witness today as the improved interoperability between the key stakeholders in disaster relief operations. Although there is improved interoperability, the ability of FEMA and NORTHCOM to gain a common operating picture continues to hamper operations. As a result, this research recommends revisions of the federal disaster declaration process as it relates to the use of Title 10 forces; improvement to FEMA's current operating procedures; perfecting NORTHCOM's employment of its military assets; and developing better relations with other disaster relief stakeholders.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My journey of a thousand miles began with a few shaky steps. I am indebted for the success of this research to my committee members, without their support and mentorship I will not have completed this research. Thank you all for your technical and tactical support, for your tolerance, and mentorship. To Dr. Cupp thank you for making this arduous experience look easy; to Mr. Turgeon thank you very much for all your reassurance and encouragement, it was vital; to LTC Clark thank you for keeping me very honest and for your enduring guidance. This research has been a sweet-sorrow event in my life. When I began this research, I had a Mother and Father. However, within fourteen weeks, I lost my Mother and Father. Every day after I lost my parents I wanted to give up on this research, but the love of my life, Leigh Ellen, will not allow me to quit on myself. To my love, Leigh Ellen, thank you for keeping me going and being the continuous source of my daily motivation. To Mom and Dad this research is dedicated to you and thank you for being you.

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ACRONYMS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ARNORTH	Army North
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive
COP	Common Operating Picture
CST	Civil Support Teams
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DSC	Dual Status Commander
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	Joint Task Force
LMD	Logistics Management Directorate
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NRF	National Response Framework
OIG	Office of Inspector General
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TAG	Adjutant General
U.S.	United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Our goal is to put the right forces on the ground at the right place and at the right time to save lives.¹

— General Ed Eberhart, Commander, NORTHCOM

The following pages will describe the history of government involvement in disaster relief, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The background information in the subsequent pages covers the periods beginning in the 1800s. This historical information is provided to orient the readers through the annals of government involvement in disaster relief and provide a brief edification on FEMA and NORTHCOM. This research as a whole is limited to Army logistics support to civil authorities between 1990 and 2012.

The Problem

Eight years later, the lessons learned from the catastrophic hurricane Katrina that devastated the southern region of the United States (U.S.) are still applicable today. Katrina gave rise to what we witness today as the improved interoperability between the key stakeholders in disaster relief operations. There is no denying the improved coordination between stakeholders, but the ability of FEMA and U.S. NORTHCOM, to

¹United States Northern Command, NORAD and USNORTHCOM Public Affairs, “Forging Relationships, Finding Solutions To Save Lives,” by Merrie Schilter-Lowe, August 27, 2004, <http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/tabid/3104/Article/1926/sg-forging-relationships-finding-solutions-to-save-lives.aspx> (accessed August 5, 2013).

gain a common operating picture on the availability of assets, location of distribution centers, and support personnel continues to frustrate operations.

Primary Research Question

The question for this research is what is the primary logistical role of the Army in Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)? The government response to the hurricane, which devastated New Orleans and much of the Gulf Coast, ruined the reputation of President Bush's Administration.² The blame for the poor Katrina response must be shared by the federal, state, and local governments, especially in dealing with the hurricane related problems in New Orleans. Today, all stakeholders involved in emergency and disaster relief operations are still unable to get a common operating picture of the disaster requirements and unified command and control.

Secondary Research Questions

In order to find a viable solution to the primary question, several more questions need to be addressed and answered. The secondary questions include, what are the logistical characteristics or type of support? What are the Army's primary tasks?

Key Terms

To understand the Army logistics role in DSCA, a few key words need to be described. These words are used throughout the research paper and are key terms used in government and military logistics communities when discussing Army logistics. The

²Matt Donnelly, "George Bush Calls Kanye West's 2005 Race Comment 'Disgusting'," *Los Angeles Times*, November 3, 2010, <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/gossip/2010/11/president-bush-kanye-west-racist-memoir.html> (accessed August 5, 2013).

terms and acronyms as defined as part of this research paper are described below. These terms are used within the context of this research paper in these manners.

Common Operating Picture (COP). Is the display of relevant information shared by more than one stakeholder to help facilitate collaborative planning and to gain situational awareness.³

Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). Describes the Army's support to civil authorities during times of national emergencies and natural disaster. DSCA involves Army battalions, brigades, division headquarters, and Army Service Component Headquarters providing support, but does not include Army National Guard support, in-state Active Duty status falls outside the definition of DSCA.⁴

Gulf Coast. The Gulf Coast is a geographic area in the extreme southern U.S. along the northern portion of the Gulf of Mexico. Stretching in a large, flattened U shape for more than 1,200 miles, it extends about 100 miles inland and runs north-northwest along western Florida; west along southern Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana; and southwest and south along southeastern Texas.⁵

³Department of Homeland Security (DHS), *Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Analysis and Operations (A&O) Common Operating Picture (COP)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief Information Officer, 2012), <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/itpa-ao-cop2012.pdf> (accessed August 7, 2013).

⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp3_28.pdf (accessed June 8, 2013).

⁵Encyclopædia Britannica, "Gulf Coast," <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/249150/Gulf-Coast> (accessed April 5, 2013).

Hurricane Katrina. Was one of the strongest storms to affect the coast of the U.S. during the last 100 years. Katrina caused widespread devastation along the central Gulf Coast states. In cities such as New Orleans, Louisiana; Mobile, Alabama; and Gulfport, Mississippi bore the brunt of Katrina's force and needed weeks and months of recovery efforts to restore normality.⁶

Interoperability. This is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces. The service allows exchange of information to enable different systems to operate effectively together.⁷

Logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, it is the aspects of military operations that deal with design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services.⁸

⁶Anne Waple, *Hurricane Katrina* (National Climatic Data Center, Asheville, NC, December 29, 2005), <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/special-reports/katrina.html> (accessed August 5, 2013).

⁷TheFreeDictionary.com, "Definition of Interoperability," <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/interoperability> (accessed August 7, 2013).

⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), US Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (accessed June 8, 2013).

New Orleans. A major port city in the southern U.S. It is also the largest city in the state of Louisiana.⁹

U.S. Army. The Army of the U.S. is the agency that organizes and trains soldiers for land warfare. This organization is comprised of Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian components.¹⁰

Limitations

This research is limited to the logistical role of the U.S. Army in DSCA. This research is further limited to focusing on activities from 1990 to 2012, and examining ways of making the process more efficient. However, the background section of this research chapter will provide information that helps navigate the readers through the history of government involvement in disaster relief, FEMA, and NORTHCOM. This research is also limited to the conduct of disaster relief operations in the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii. The research focuses on hurricane disaster relief and other natural disaster relief operations. The research addresses challenges presented in providing logistical support to disaster relief operations, with emphasis on the activities of FEMA and NORTHCOM. The research will sometimes combine measurable impacts of actions by all branches of the U.S. military as opposed to just measuring impact of U.S. Army actions DSCA.

⁹Collins English Dictionary, “New Orleans,” 10th ed. (Harper Collins, August 2009), <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/new+orleans%27> (accessed August 5, 2013).

¹⁰TheFreeDictionary.com, “U. S. Army,” <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/U.+S.+Army> (accessed August 7, 2013).

Importance of the Research

This research is important to Army and federal, state, and local government planners and logisticians because it identifies and simplifies the question of what is the Army's primary logistical role in DSCA during a homeland disaster and emergency. This question focuses on the primary purpose of providing logistics support, the primary characteristics of Army logistics support, the Army logistics organizations involved in providing the support, and the Army's primary logistics tasks. This research is significant in relation to how Army support had been conducted in the past and how it is conducted at present. This research is also important to NORTHCOM as the command attempts to gain wider understanding of its unique role in managing and supporting natural disasters. This research will also examine if there is room for eradicating redundancy and inefficiency in order to create a much more adaptive and responsible federal emergency response.

The History of Government Involvement in Disaster Relief

The Department of Defense (DOD) provides a wide range of support to many organizations. However, large military participation in domestic disaster assistance was not always the situation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a new sense of federal government progressiveness in disaster assistance and relief operations replaced the reluctance that was so prevalent during the early nineteenth century. These changes could be attributed at the time to the industrial age and the subsequent emergence of a society

with a greater sense of mutual dependence.¹¹ In 1947, the U.S. Congress created the Surplus Property Law. The law created a federal works administrator who was empowered with the ability to use all federal agencies and departments to cooperate in disaster assistance and to use surplus property held by the War Assets Administrator in disaster relief.¹²

In 1950, Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950.¹³ Congress continued to reshape the civilian relief establishment, and in 1969 renamed the Office of Emergency Planning to the Office of Emergency Preparedness. In 1973, President Richard Nixon created a new agency to assume responsibility for the federal government in disaster relief by transferring relief operations from the Office of Emergency Preparedness to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and creating the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration.¹⁴ Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974; the Act established the process of Presidential disaster declarations.¹⁵

¹¹Captain William A. Osborne, "The History of Military Assistance for Domestic Natural Disasters: The Return to a Primary Role for the Department of Defense in the Twenty-First Century," *The Army Lawyer-DA PAM 27-50-403*, no. 403 (December 2006).

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Andrew S. Mener, "Disaster Response in the United States of America: An Analysis of the Bureaucratic and Political History of a Failing System," *College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal* (2007), <http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=curej> (accessed August 5, 2013).

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Ibid.*

In 1979, FEMA was created and it became the lead federal agency responsible for providing disaster relief in the U.S.¹⁶

The History of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

After the devastating fire that ripped through the city of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in the early morning hours of December 26, 1802, Congress suspended bond payments for several months for the merchants affected by the fire, thus implementing the first act of federal disaster relief in American history.¹⁷ Other larger fires in 1835 and 1871 led to more ad hoc legislation from Congress. The limited support provided by the federal government during the Galveston Hurricane in 1900 and the San Francisco Earthquake in 1906 spurred a national debate over the federal government's role in providing assistance following domestic disasters.¹⁸

In 1950, Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950. This Act was a comprehensive domestic disaster plan intended to fund and coordinate all federal disaster relief efforts. The Act also allowed the President to declare major disaster areas and authorize federal relief in the cases of flood, fire, hurricanes, earthquakes, drought, and storms. In addition, the Act designated the Red Cross as the leading non-governmental organization and the Public Health Service, as the federal agencies to respond in the

¹⁶National Archives, Executive Orders 12148, *Federal Emergency Management*, July 20, 1979, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12148.html> (accessed August 5, 2013).

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

event of a major disaster and increased the responsibilities of the National Guard and local civil authorities.¹⁹

Congress continued to reshape the civilian relief establishment, and in 1969 renamed the Office of Emergency Planning to the Office of Emergency Preparedness. In 1973, President Richard Nixon created a new agency to assume responsibility for the federal government in disaster relief by transferring relief operations from the Office of Emergency Preparedness to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and creating the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration.²⁰ Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974; the Act established the process of Presidential disaster declarations.²¹ In 1979, President Jimmy Carter under Executive Order 12,148, created FEMA. All federal disaster assistance, administration, and agencies were consolidated under FEMA.²² However, despite the creation of FEMA criticism of civilian federal disaster relief management continued. Since 1979, FEMA has been the federal government's lead agency in responding to and recovering from many of the nation's greatest moments of crisis.

The passing of the Economy Act in 1982 authorizes federal government agencies to obtain goods or services by an interagency agreement. The Act also provided funding authorization for the military to support other agencies and receive reimbursement of actual costs for the goods and services provided. In 1992, during the hurricane season,

¹⁹Mener, "Disaster Response in the United States of America."

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²National Archives, Executive Orders 12148.

several hurricane disasters highlighted the inefficiency of FEMA and the inability of federal, state, and local officials to adequately conduct damage estimates and accurately determine the amount of federal assistance needed.²³ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that, in fiscal year 1999, the DOD provided support in at least 7,125 instances to at least 345 or more entities, including international organizations, private citizens, federal, state, local, and foreign governments. According to the GAO, it cost DOD about \$180 million in 1999.²⁴

In March 2003, FEMA joined 22 other federal agencies, programs, and offices in becoming the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The new department, headed by Secretary Tom Ridge, brought a coordinated approach to national security from emergencies and disasters.²⁵ On October 4, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act. The act significantly reorganized FEMA and provided it substantial new authority to remedy gaps that became apparent in the

²³Francis McCarthy, RL33053, *Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2011), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesecc/RL33053.pdf> (accessed May 12, 2013).

²⁴General Accounting Office, GAO/GAO-01-9, *Office of Inspector General. Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, January 26, 2001).

²⁵Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “About the Agency,” last updated July 22, 2013, <http://www.fema.gov/about-agency> (accessed August 9, 2013).

response to Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, the most devastating natural disaster in U.S. history.²⁶

In 2003, President George W. Bush issued a Presidential Directive consolidating several different DSCA roles and organizations under the newly created DHS. Additionally, under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5), which was created to enhance the ability of the U.S. to manage domestic incidents, a single comprehensive national incident management system was established.²⁷ The Secretary of DHS was appointed the principal federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the DHS Secretary was also responsible for coordinating federal operations within the U.S. to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.²⁸ The DHS Secretary is responsible for coordinating the federal government's resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies.²⁹ The HSPD also states that the DHS Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security Council, and administer a National Incident Management System. This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to

²⁶Keith Bea, et al., RL33729, *Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, November 2006), <http://training.fema.gov/EMIweb/edu/docs/Federal%20EM%20Policy%20Changes%20After%20Katrina.pdf> (accessed September 27, 2013).

²⁷White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, February 28, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html> (accessed August 9, 2013).

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*

work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.

The 2005 to 2010 National Incident Management System implementation objectives and guidance was comprised of five key components that each state must address in order to help mitigate disasters. These components include adoption, preparedness, communication and information management, resource management, and command and management. The plan lays out detailed milestones that need to be either initiated or completed.³⁰

To some extent, the organization structure within FEMA is still cumbersome. The two main departments are the Office of Response and Recovery and the Mission Support Bureau.³¹ The primary priority of the Mission Support Bureau is to consistently improve services to internal and external customers. The Mission Support Bureau ensures that there is adequate support, tools, and resources to ensure that FEMA can build, sustain, and improve its capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.³² The Office of Response and Recovery provides leadership to build, sustain, and improve the coordination. It also delivers support to citizens and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to save lives, reduce suffering, protect property, and

³⁰Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “National Incident Management System Implementation and Compliance Guidance By Fiscal Year 2005-2010,” last updated June 12, 2012, <http://www.fema.gov/implementation-and-compliance-guidance-fiscal-year> (accessed August 9, 2013).

³¹Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Organizational Structure,” <http://www.fema.gov/organizational-structure> (accessed August 9, 2013).

³²*Ibid.*

recover from all hazards. This department is responsible for the Disaster Declarations Unit; Office of Readiness and Assessment; Response Directorate; Recovery Directorate; Logistics Management Directorate; and Office of Federal Disaster Coordination.³³ As part of its organization structure, FEMA is divided into 10 regions. These 10 regions possess elements of autonomy, which enables them to react swiftly to specific disasters within their autonomous regions.

Primarily through FEMA, the DHS helps mitigate some of the challenges of disaster and emergency response. Today, FEMA serves as the command and control center for the synchronization of all government, interagency, and non-government agencies information and support sharing that contributes to disaster relief. The lack of support witnessed during the Katrina relief effort in 2005 was a learning experience for FEMA. FEMA received good grades from politicians and even some survivors of the Super-storm Sandy. FEMA's good grade was based in fact on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina seven years ago.³⁴

The Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve have a long history of defending our nation against all enemies, foreign and domestic. The primary responsibility of the Army is to win our nation's wars. However, in October 2012, about 7,000 Guard members helped people who were living without power while facing low

³³Ibid.

³⁴Brian Naylor, "Lessons From Katrina Boost FEMA's Sandy Response," NPR.org, November 3, 2012, <http://www.npr.org/2012/11/03/164224394/lessons-from-katrina-boost-femas-sandy-response> (accessed April 5, 2013).

temperatures, and people whose water ruined possessions were piled at the curb, in communities' worst hit by Hurricane Sandy.³⁵

The History of Northern Command

Prompted by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil, NORTHCOM was authorized by President George W. Bush on April 17, 2002.³⁶ DOD announced the establishment of NORTHCOM to consolidate under a single unified command those existing homeland defense and civil support missions that were previously executed by other military organizations. On May 8, 2002, U.S. Air Force General Ralph E. Eberhart was nominated to be the first commander of NORTHCOM.³⁷ NORTHCOM's mission is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the U.S., its territories, and interests. To this end, personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are assigned to coordinate the protection of North America from external threats, drawing on the full capabilities of all U.S. military services, including the National Guard and Coast Guard, as necessary.³⁸ Additionally, the command is charged with providing DSCA when approved by the President or Secretary

³⁵Jim Greenhill, "National Guard Relieves Suffering after Hurricane Sandy," The Official Homepage of the United States Army, November 4, 2012, <http://www.army.mil/article/90599/> (accessed May 12, 2013).

³⁶United States Northern Command, "A Short History of United States Northern Command," December 31, 2012, <http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/Documents/Supporting%20documents/Historical/NORTHCOM%20History.pdf> (accessed August 5, 2013).

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

of Defense. NORTHCOM also provides military resources and support to federal, state, and local authorities.³⁹

Throughout its first few years, NORTHCOM faced the usual hurdles of building a command, acquiring needed work force, defining the correct organization and relationships, writing the necessary plans related to its mission, and conducting training and exercises.⁴⁰ However, NORTHCOM was also challenged with real world issues as it built its way to full operational capability. These challenges included, developing communication with other DOD organizations and external federal agencies, responding to a space shuttle accident, providing assistance to natural disasters, and providing support to an expanding list of special national security events and presidential mission support.⁴¹

Through 2010, the command has not had to respond to a large-scale threat calling for military intervention and its efforts in this area remain focused on preparation and prevention. However, the command was frequently called upon to respond to requests from civil authorities to provide assistance during and in the wake of national disasters. In disaster relief operations, the National Guard Forces operating under their state's government are the primary provider of military assistance. However if those forces become overwhelmed or a particular need best met by the military was required, NORTHCOM employed forces, equipment, and expertise upon request.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid.

In accordance with Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-28, *Defense Support to Civil Authorities*, NORTHCOM or any other federalized forces do not supersede civil authorities.⁴² Rather, the philosophy behind NORTHCOM's participation in DSCA was to be prepared at all times but only to act when requested and to depart just as soon as their support was no longer required. The majority of disasters in which NORTHCOM provided assistance were natural, such as hurricanes, floods, and wildfires. They also provided assistance during the Space Shuttle Columbia re-entry disaster, which scattered debris across parts of Texas and Louisiana in February 2003.⁴³ Additionally, NORTHCOM was on-hand to provide assistance during the massive oil spill created by the failure of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.⁴⁴

In 2005, the command faced its most significant disaster to date, providing support to Hurricane Katrina victims. As part of its hurricane monitoring and disaster planning, NORTHCOM was already planning for Hurricane Katrina when it made landfall in New Orleans and levees protecting the city failed, inflicting wide spread damage across the region. As the storm subsided, NORTHCOM forces deployed to the region, under the direction of Joint Task Force Katrina Commander Lieutenant General Russel Honoré and conducted recovery operations at the request of civil authorities.⁴⁵ In all, more than 22,000 military personnel from every branch of the U.S. military

⁴²Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

⁴³United States Northern Command, "A Short History of United States Northern Command."

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

participated in the effort, which included search and rescue, security assessment, advice, evacuation, recovery of deceased persons, health, and medical support, restoration of infrastructure, and logistics.⁴⁶ NORTHCOM was actively engaged in assisting the wildfires outbreaks in western U.S. in 2007, spring flooding in the central U.S. in 2008, and California wildfires in the summer 2008.⁴⁷

Since 2008, NORTHCOM has continued to consolidate its command and control responsible for homeland defense and disaster relief assistance, it has successfully consolidated it numerous command centers into one.⁴⁸ Between 2007 and 2010, NORTHCOM saw the maturation of its strategic communication. Under the watch of the current NORTHCOM Commander, General Charles H. Jacoby, NORTHCOM has continued to emphasize the importance of mission partners in all that the command does.⁴⁹

The crowning achievement of NORTHCOM came recently during its support to Hurricane Sandy victims. Hurricane Sandy brought tragedy to the homes of many Americans on the east coast. In response, NORTHCOM moved capabilities to aid FEMA and other government agencies. The lessons learned on improving interagency coordination from previous DSCA operations paid tremendous dividends during the

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Charles Jacoby, "Statement of General Charles Jacoby, Commander United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command before the House Armed Services Committee," House Armed Services Committee, March 20, 2013, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130320/100395/HHRG-113-AS00-Wstate-JacobyG-20130320.pdf> (accessed August 5, 2013).

hurricane season. The motto throughout Hurricane Sandy from Jacoby was “lean forward, anticipate our partners’ requirements, and don’t be late to need.”⁵⁰ By maintaining this posture during the early stages of the hurricane, NORTHCOM supported multiple requests for support. Working with FEMA, the National Guard Bureau, and the individual states, NORTHCOM estimated required support and prepositioned Title 10 resources in order to respond as soon as requested to the region.⁵¹ The Dual Status Commanders (DSCs) provided critical leadership to achieve greater unity of effort between federal and state military forces in preparing for and responding to the devastating effects of this hurricane.⁵² As a result, NORTHCOM was able to support federal, state, and local partners by facilitating power restoration, fuel distribution, transportation, and public health and safety support.⁵³

Summary

Disasters, both natural and man-made, have been a part of our everyday lives for centuries. If one pays attention to meteorologists and global warming enthusiasts, it looks like natural disasters are here to stay and will continue to occur within the U.S. However, unlike the victims of the Galveston Hurricane in 1900 and the San Francisco Earthquake

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹United States Northern Command, “A Short History of United States Northern Command.”

⁵²Charles S. Clark, “FEMA Chief Says Pre-staging Is Key to Rapid Disaster Response,” *National Journal Group, Government Executive*, October 25, 2011, <http://www.govexec.com/defense/2011/10/fema-chief-says-pre-staging-is-key-to-rapid-disaster-response/35241/> (accessed August 5, 2013).

⁵³United States Northern Command, “A Short History of United States Northern Command.”

in 1906, victims of natural disasters have many federal, state, and local resources available. In addition, technological advancement over the last 50 years has made weather forecasting and predicting natural disasters easier.

Over the past few years, FEMA, the lead federal agency responsible for leading the U.S. efforts in preparation and mitigation of natural incidents, has consolidated its mission, personnel, and resources. Furthermore, NORTHCOM has weathered some difficult periods and it is now postured to support DSCA when called upon to mobilize in support of FEMA. Some of the success witnessed in disaster relief operations can be attributed to two key takeaways from this chapter. First, when working together in a joint interagency environment, the ability to share information and gain a common operating picture improves the efficiency and effectiveness of operations. Second, understanding and appreciating the difficult transitions that have occurred in government involvement in disaster relief, FEMA, and NORTHCOM. This chapter also highlighted the maturity of FEMA, and the resources and experience that NORTHCOM can now employ in support to DSCA operations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the last decade, renewed emphasis has been placed on creating and developing a homeland response system capable of minimizing the effects of any disaster on the national community. However, the effectiveness of our homeland response system has been a question of debate at all levels of our government. In August 2012, a special report by the Heritage Foundation, *Critical Mismatch: The Dangerous Gap between Rhetoric and Readiness in DOD's Civil Support Missions*, came to the conclusion the homeland response system is unprepared to respond to disasters.⁵⁴ One of the underlining reasons for this predicament is the lack of coordination between the military entities, specifically U.S. NORTHCOM and FEMA. Army logistics support to civil authorities in homeland response is coordinated through NORTHCOM. The several layers of bureaucracy that must be navigated in order for the Army to provide logistics support in homeland response are enormous.

The report described how an attack employing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive (CBRNE) weapons would likely produce a large number of U.S. casualties. This is because NORTHCOM, the command responsible for responding to such an attack, is not operationally prepared to address this foreseeable threat.

⁵⁴The Honorable Paul McHale, *Critical Mismatch: The Dangerous Gap between Rhetoric and Readiness in DOD's Civil Support Missions* (The Heritage Foundation, 2012), <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/critical-mismatch-the-dangerous-gap-between-rhetoric-and-readiness-in-dod-civil-support-missions> (accessed June 23, 2013).

NORTHCOM lacks sufficient personnel with the necessary training to respond to disasters.

In a United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report to Congress in May 2008, the GAO reported that NORTHCOM has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from the DHS or the states on the specific requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster.⁵⁵ The GAO also reported that although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and procedures.⁵⁶ Additionally, while the states have adequate forces to respond to a mid-range CBRNE events, the President lacks sufficient federal forces to respond to a complex catastrophe.⁵⁷

Army logistics support to civil authorities is here to stay and the scale of support has increased over the last decade.⁵⁸ There are a number of books, articles, government documents, and military doctrine published on the subject of Army support to civil authorities. In this chapter, the researcher will scrutinize some of those documents for their significance in providing a potential solution to the concerns raised in the Heritage Foundation report and this research. The researcher presented the literature under three

⁵⁵Government Accountability Office, GAO 08-251, *U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2008).

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷McHale, *Critical Mismatch*.

⁵⁸Mener, "Disaster Response in the United States of America."

distinct categories. The first category consists of military manuals and doctrine that describe defense support to civil authorities. The researcher drilled down within those documents to highlight Army support, especially logistics support, provided to civil authorities. The second category encompasses official federal government department documents with special emphasis on information and documentation from FEMA, the subject matter expert on disaster relief operations. This research focuses on the relationship and coordination between NORTHCOM, FEMA, and other stakeholders involved in supporting homeland response. The third category is a telephone conversation with Mr. Brian Ebert, the Operations and Planning Officer for United States Army North (ARNORTH). ARNORTH, as the direct tasking entity for Army support to civil authorities, possess a weight of information about supporting homeland response. The data within each group is organized in chronological order to demonstrate progress over the past 18 years and to articulate Army logistics support to civil authorities.

Category 1—Military Manuals and Doctrine

Hurricane Katrina was a truly catastrophic domestic emergency, both in the number of deaths and the untold damage and destruction caused by the storm. After this unmitigated disaster in 2005, coordination between governmental and non-governmental agencies has improved. Interagency coordination and execution during natural disasters is a necessity and is now more common. FEMA remains the federally mandated agency responsible for organizing, controlling, synchronizing, and being ultimately responsible for natural disaster relief. NORTHCOM is the lead DOD military agency responsible for organizing, controlling, and managing military support to civil authorities. In recent

years, FEMA and NORTHCOM have developed improved working relations during natural disasters and national emergencies.

The backbone of DSCA is the joint manuals and doctrine. The joint publication serves as a basic framework to synchronize efforts to accomplish the DSCA missions. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense* and JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, are strategic documents that lay out basic functions and guidance to establish a common operating picture for joint military and interagency logistics planning operations.

Joint Publication 3-0, 3-7, and 4-0 are foundation manuals that describe fundamental planning considerations and requirements to synchronize joint interagency operations. These manuals maintain that the key to mission accomplishment is establishing a unified action under one unified command. Unified action is the “synchronization, coordination and integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.”⁵⁹ Another key factor in joint and interagency operations is the ability for all stakeholders to see the same COP. The aforementioned are two important elements that are essential for DSCA mission accomplishment.

In JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, chapter 5 discusses joint operations in DSCA. For DSCA operations, DOD supports but does not supplant civil authorities within a state, the state’s governor is the key decision maker for DSCA.⁶⁰ JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*

⁵⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2011).

⁶⁰*Ibid.*

provides a meticulous introduction to homeland defense operations, command relationships, and interagency responsibilities. It describes air, land, maritime, and space operations in the context of homeland defense, plus it outlines other supporting homeland defense operations and enabling activities.⁶¹ JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics* is the keystone document for joint logistics. As such, it provides overarching joint doctrine on logistic support to joint operations, to include DSCA.⁶² Many crisis response missions, such as DSCA and other disaster relief operations, are time-sensitive sourcing of critical commodities and capabilities, and rapid delivery to the point of need. In these operations, joint logistics is most often the main effort. Under Joint Command, DOD provides support to civil authorities upon request for support under the National Response Framework. DOD resources are used to support federal, state, and local authorities. These operations frequently involve supplying food and water, providing medical support, medical evacuation, creating temporary shelter, providing contracting support, conducting distribution operations, and assisting in the evacuation of the affected population. In the event of an incident involving CBRNE, joint logistics operations may support such an emergency in the clearance of debris and restoration of essential public services.

Army Techniques Publications 3-28.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities and Integrating with National Guard Civil Support*, identifies multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for DSCA

⁶¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007).

⁶²Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 4-0.

operations and the integration of the National Guard in civil support.⁶³ Army Techniques Publications 3-28.1 is a joint framework manual co-written by the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force. It highlights the necessity of unity of efforts amongst the different services in the conduct of DSCA. Army Techniques Publications 3-28.1 arrays the multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures at the unit tactical level to assist military planners and commanders in the employment of military resources in DSCA. The multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures focuses on planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of DSCA operations conducted in conjunction with FEMA.

In Army doctrine, Field Manual 3-28, *Civil Support Operations* provides keystone Army doctrine for civil support operations. It expands on the discussion of civil support operations, the fourth element of full spectrum operations. This Field Manual focuses on the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of civil support operations, which are conducted within the U.S. It discusses the role of Army forces cooperating with and supporting civilian organizations in domestic operational environments.⁶⁴

Army Doctrine Publication 4-0 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, *Sustainment*, supports ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. These principle level manuals focus on how the elements of sustainment (logistics, personnel services, and health services) support operational mission accomplishment by

⁶³ Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center, Army Techniques Publications (ATP) 3-28.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities and Integrating with National Guard Civil Support* (Langley AFB, VA: ALSA Center, 2013), US Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (accessed June 29, 2013).

⁶⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-28, *Civil Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), US Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (accessed June 8, 2013).

Army forces. “It serves as the doctrinal bridge fostering the understanding of the seamless nature and essential linkages of sustainment capabilities from the strategic base to tactical level operations.”⁶⁵

Army Doctrine Publication 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* and ADRP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* build on the doctrinal foundation established for the Army’s contribution to DSCA. Both manuals explain how the Army, including all components, conducts DSCA missions and National Guard civil support missions as part of unified land operations. ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28 focus on achieving unity of effort among the Army battalions, brigades, division headquarters, and Army Service Component Commands conducting DSCA.

Army Doctrine Publication 3-28 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. However, this manual does not apply to certain Army organizations and activities that support DSCA. For example, when state Army National Guard is in support of state disaster relief activities, their status falls outside the definition of DSCA. Also, ADP 3-28 does not address domestic counterterrorism operations and does not apply to any state defense force or equivalent that is not part of a state’s National Guard. Finally, ADP 3-28 does not apply to military activities conducted wholly within any military installation in the U.S. and it does not apply to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, although the Corps of Engineers plays a significant role in DSCA.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 4-0, *Sustainment* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), US Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (accessed June 23, 2013).

⁶⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

Army Doctrine Publication 3-28 communicates the Army's doctrinal support to DSCA. It highlights four distinct areas of emphasis for the Army. The first area defines the primary purpose for Army support. The Army's primary purpose in DSCA is defined as "missions with overarching purpose of saving lives, alleviating suffering, and protecting property."⁶⁷ The second area covers the primary characteristics of Army support. It defines Army support to civil authorities and explains that the civil authorities are in charge. It makes clear that Army forces will depart when the civil authorities are able to accomplish the mission without Army support and that the cost of the Army's direct and indirect support must be documented.⁶⁸ The third area involves the Army organizations in DSCA. The Army organizations engaged in DSCA include the Army National Guard, under the command of the state governors, and the Active and Reserve Army under the command of the President.⁶⁹ The final area is the primary tasks of the Army. The Army's primary tasks encompass providing support to domestic disasters, domestic CBRNE, civilian law enforcement, and other designated support.⁷⁰

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-28 is organized into four distinct chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the Army's role in the homeland response. The chapter explains how Army's contributions to DSCA fall within the broader context of a comprehensive national and military framework for national preparedness. Chapter 2 covers the purposes and characteristics of Army contributions to DSCA, and includes key

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid.

legal considerations related to the employment of military forces in the homeland.

Chapter 3 discusses how Army forces organize to achieve unity of effort. Chapter 4 describes the tasks of decisive action performed by Army forces conducting DSCA and National Guard civil support.⁷¹

Chapter 4 of ADRP 3-28 discusses how the Army uses the core competencies of decisive action (offense, defense, and stability) in support of homeland response. In DSCA, decisive action refers to how Army forces combine DSCA tasks to support homeland security and DSCA tasks with offensive and defensive tasks to support homeland defense. According to chapter 4, the Army conducts four competency tasks in support of DCSA. These tasks include providing support to domestic disasters; providing support to civilian law enforcement; providing support to CBRNE incidents; and providing other designated domestic support.⁷² During DSCA operations, in the spirit of mission command, Army forces accomplished assigned tasks from their chain of command and do not follow orders from the civil authorities. ARNORTH is responsible for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and bulk resupply for deployed Army forces. The Theater Sustainment Command is responsible for coordinating sustainment for federal military forces. Assigned units usually arrive in disaster relief areas with more than three days of supplies and their equipment. Characteristically,

⁷¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2013), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_28.pdf (accessed September 9, 2013).

⁷²*Ibid.*

disaster response places stress on the local logistics and transportation system and there are needs to acquire sustainment support from outside the disaster areas.

The Commander of NORTHCOM, General Charles Jacoby, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on July 28, 2011, said the following about NORTHCOM, “In all of our mission areas, complex relationships are the key to effectiveness, particularly in support to civil authorities and defense of the homeland.”⁷³ NORTHCOM was created in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and it is charged with the responsibility for overall military defense of the U.S. homeland and DSCA. Twelve years later, NORTHCOM the military lead in DSCA is still working through some of the growing pains of managing and coordinating with the many federal, state, local, and independent entities involved in DSCA. According to the Heritage Foundation Report in August 2012, “NORTHCOM still lacks many of the critical capabilities needed to carry out its DSCA missions.”⁷⁴

As the unified combatant command for the U.S. and the key military player during natural disaster operations, NORTHCOM is faced with numerous criticisms. NORTHCOM has continued to make progress toward resolving its shortcomings. It has developed closer working relations with FEMA and it is attempting to bridge the gaps between the copious agencies involved in disaster relief. One of the other problems facing NORTHCOM is the ability to integrate Title 10 and Title 32 forces across a mission set. In October 2008, DOD Directives made the Chief of the National Guard

⁷³Association of the United States Army, “U.S. Army North/Fifth Army: Building Relationships for a Secure Homeland,” *Voice of the Army-Support for the Soldier* (December 2011): 1-4.

⁷⁴McHale, *Critical Mismatch*.

Bureau, the senior ranking officer in the National Guard, the Deputy Commander of NORTHCOM. This will help resolve the all too common command and control issues between Title 10 and Title 32 forces. All things considered, NORTHCOM is in a better position to support DSCA than it was just a few years ago.

Category 2—Federal Government Documents

In order to address this category of federal government documents, the researcher focused on the key national and strategic planning and implementation documents available on DSCA. The documents reviewed included the 2002 Presidential Report, *The Department of Homeland Security*; 2002 Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security*; 2005 Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*; 2006 and 2010 *National Security Strategy*; 2009 Department of Homeland Security, *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*; 2013 Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*; and the Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, fiscal years 2008-2013, *One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland*.

Before the devastating attack of September 11, 2001, there were over 100 different agencies responsible for homeland security.⁷⁵ The changing nature of the threats facing the U.S. requires a new government approach and structure to protect against visible and invisible enemies that can strike with a wide variety of weapons. With that as the backdrop, in 2002 President Bush proposed the creation of a new DHS. In the 2002

⁷⁵President of the United States, *The Department of Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2002), <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf> (accessed June 29, 2013).

Presidential Report, *Department of Homeland Security*, the President advocated for a cabinet-level department with the sole responsibility and authority to consolidate all the various support agencies under one umbrella. Still fresh with the memories of 9/11, the idea of creating a single entity for homeland security represented the most significant transformation of the U.S. Government, since the creation of the U.S. Air Force with the National Security Act of 1947. As President Bush envisaged, this new department will greatly transform and realign the current confusing patchwork of government activities into a single department whose primary mission is to protect our homeland. The creation of a DHS is one key step in the President's national strategy for homeland security.⁷⁶

Whereas FEMA had a cabinet-level post in the 1990s, the new DHS structure subordinated FEMA to the Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, who reports to the Secretary of DHS. FEMA became the centerpiece component of DHS and this department administers the grant programs for firefighters, police, and emergency personnel currently managed by FEMA, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Health and Human Services. FEMA also manages such critical response assets as the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, from Department of Energy and the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, from the Department of Health and Human Services. But most important, FEMA is responsible for integrating all the federal interagency emergency response plans into a single, comprehensive, government wide plan, and ensure that all response personnel have the equipment and capability to communicate and receive a COP.⁷⁷

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

Under this presidential document, DHS would make Americans safer because the nation would have one department whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland. A singular department to secure U.S. borders, transportation sector, ports, and critical infrastructure. In addition, this one department will synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence from multiple sources; coordinate communications with state and local governments, private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness; coordinate efforts to protect the American people against bioterrorism and other weapons of mass destruction; and help train and equip first responders. Finally this department will manage federal emergency response activities.⁷⁸

The 2002 Office of Homeland Security, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* established the strategic objective of homeland security in order to prioritize resources to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S., reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. As part of this strategic planning, DHS now has a clear and efficient organizational structure with four divisions. These divisions include the Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The Emergency Preparedness and Response division is responsible for federal government assistance in domestic disaster preparedness and coordinating the government's disaster response efforts.⁷⁹

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Department of Homeland Security, *National Strategic for Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002).

This 2002 document was the first comprehensive federal government document on homeland security. In the document, in reference to emergency preparedness and response, the document highlighted the major initiatives for FEMA.⁸⁰ The major initiatives include integrating separate federal response plans into a single all discipline incident management plan, creating a national incident management system, improving tactical counterterrorist capabilities, enabling seamless communication among all responders, preparing health care providers for catastrophic terrorism, augmenting America's pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles, preparing for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear decontamination, and planning for military support to civil authorities.

The 2005 Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* focuses primarily on DOD's activities in the U.S. homeland and the approaches to the U.S. The DOD undertakes a range of activities to secure the U.S. from direct attack. The DOD is equipped to execute military missions that dissuade, deter, and defeat attacks upon the nation. The DOD provides support to civil authorities upon direction from the President or Secretary of Defense. This support is part of a comprehensive national response to prevent and protect against terrorist incidents or recover from an attack or disaster. DOD also provides support to FEMA and other federal agencies when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Finally, DOD seeks to improve the homeland defense and homeland security contributions of U.S. domestic and international partners, and in turn, to improve DOD capabilities by sharing expertise and technology, as appropriate, across military and civilian boundaries. This document also

⁸⁰Ibid.

organized military support and oversight for DSCA through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. It established roles for the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, NORTHCOM, United States Pacific Command, and North American Aerospace Defense Command.⁸¹

The 2006 and 2010 *National Security Strategy* had limited information regarding DSCA. The 2006 document did however highlight the success achieved by the establishment of the DHS. By 2006, the DHS has consolidated authority for 22 federal entities with vital roles to play in protecting the nation and preventing terrorist attacks within the U.S.⁸² On the other hand the 2010 document discussed how the functions of the DHS have taken on new urgency in the current operational environment. The document highlighted how DHS has strives to adapt its traditional functions to confront new threats and evolving hazards and the continuing reorganization happening with the department.⁸³

In March 2007, before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security Committee on Appropriations for Preparing and Responding to Disasters, Mr. William O. Jenkins, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues testified about the challenges facing DHS and FEMA. Jenkins highlighted the continued challenges, including clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities,

⁸¹Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005).

⁸²White House, *2006 The National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2006).

⁸³White House, *2010 The National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010).

and establishing accountability systems to provide effective response while also protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse.⁸⁴

During these testimonies and subsequent testimonies in July 2007, on the Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters, the GAO discussed the extent to which the DHS and FEMA has taken steps to overcome their challenges. To facilitate clarity, defined levels of authorities have been created at all levels. This creation promotes rapid and effective decision making, lucid legal authorities, and articulated roles and responsibilities at all government levels. Improved capabilities are being developed for catastrophic disasters, particularly in the areas of situational assessment and awareness, emergency communications, evacuations, search and rescue, logistics, and mass care and sheltering. Effectively implementing the provisions of the Post-Katrina Reform Act of 2006 addressed many of these issues and FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas. But their operational impact in a major disaster has not yet been tested.⁸⁵

In July 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held a hearing to review FEMA's preparedness to handle a future disaster. The Acting Deputy

⁸⁴Government Accountability Office, *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. Homeland Security Preparing for and Responding to Disaster* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007).

⁸⁵U.S. Congress, House, GAO 07-1142T, *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. "Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 2007).

Administrator and Chief of Operations for FEMA testified that the “new FEMA”⁸⁶ had made progress in many areas related to disaster preparedness. The Deputy Administrator, addressed actions FEMA had taken to correct some of the internal challenges identified within the FEMA organization. The Deputy Administrator addressed how the, new FEMA, is much better prepared to handle national disasters. However, the testimony ended with the Deputy Administrator acknowledging that FEMA was not fully prepared for a catastrophic disaster. In turn, the Committee requested that the Deputy Inspector General for Emergency Management Oversight, in the Office of Inspector General (OIG), provide a high-level assessment of the DHS and FEMA’s preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster.

The OIG published the report in March 2008 and identified the primary objectives of the assessment. The inspection was conducted to identify key areas for preparing for a catastrophic disaster and to determine the progress FEMA had made in the key areas since the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005. The OIG examined pertinent reports, including those internal to the OIG and the GAO, as well as congressional testimony from FEMA’s leadership. The OIG identified nine key areas critical to successful catastrophic preparedness efforts. OIG collaborated with FEMA officials to identify two to five critical components within each key area. They interviewed FEMA officials and evaluated documents provided. Finally OIG assessed FEMA’s progress in each of the

⁸⁶U.S. Congress, House, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communication, Preparedness, and Response of the Committee on Homeland Security*, “Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Ensuring FEMA’s Ability to Respond and Recover in the Wake of a National Catastrophe,” 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2008), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg43752/html/CHRG-110hhrg43752.htm> <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080409125035-32109.pdf> (accessed June 24, 2013).

areas using a four-tiered scale of substantial progress, moderate progress, modest progress, and limited or no progress.⁸⁷

The OIG concluded that FEMA had made moderate progress in five of the nine key areas, modest progress in three areas, and limited progress in one area. The OIG identified that budget shortfalls, reorganizations, inadequate information technology systems, and confusing or limited authorities negatively affected FEMA's progress. The OIG recommended better knowledge management and plans for sustaining initiatives that are underway. Additionally, the OIG recommended that FEMA conduct a comprehensive needs analysis to determine where they are now and where they need to be, as well as develop and sustain a system for tracking progress of programs, initiatives, and enhancements and provide regular updates regarding progress on all major preparedness initiatives and projects.

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan publication, in March 2009, highlighted the importance of the National Response Coordination Center. The National Response Coordination Center is a multi-agency team operating from FEMA Headquarters that functions as the operational component of the DHS. The National Response Coordination Center coordinates personnel and resource deployments to support disaster operations and prioritizes interagency allocation of resources. It also

⁸⁷Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, OIG-08-34, *FEMA's Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, March 2008), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-34_Mar08.pdf (accessed March 30, 2013).

maintains situational awareness linkages with regional, state, and local partners and a continuous watch team.⁸⁸

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan also described FEMA's role in activities to reduce the vulnerability of buildings to terrorist attacks. In support of this mission, FEMA created the Risk Management Series, a collection of publications directed toward providing design guidance to mitigate the consequences of man-made disasters. Finally, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan discussed the Federal Hazard Mitigation Programs. FEMA is responsible and administers three programs that provide funds for activities that reduce the losses from future disasters or help prevent the occurrence of catastrophes. These hazard mitigation programs include the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, and the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. These programs enable grant recipients to undertake activities such as the elevation of structures in floodplains, the relocation of structures from floodplains, the construction of structural enhancements to facilities, buildings in earthquake prone areas, and modifications of land plans to ensure that future construction ameliorates hazardous conditions.

The July 2010 report from the DHS OIG described how FEMA has made significant progress in enhancing its logistics capability and based on recent initiatives, FEMA is better prepared now than at any previous time to deal with a catastrophic disaster. In spite of dramatic changes following a congressionally mandated reorganization in 2007, resulting in the creation of the Logistics Management Directorate

⁸⁸Department of Homeland Security, *National Infrastructure Protection Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

(LMD), a number of persistent issues inhibit further improvement. FEMA also made great strides to improve its logistics capability by increasing staff levels, training and developing personnel, enhancing coordination among federal, state, and local governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, developing plans and exercises to improve readiness, utilizing interagency agreements and contracts for needed commodities, conducting meetings and teleconferences with logistics partners and reviewing and evaluating performance. The logistics transformation that began in 2007 is expected to be completed by 2014.⁸⁹

According to the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, in order to field faster, more flexible consequence management response forces, in support of DSCA and FEMA, DOD has harnessed the lessons learned from previous DSCA engagements. Since the surprise attack of 9/11, DOD has begun to reorganize the military forces to enhance their lifesaving capabilities, maximize their flexibility, and reduce their response times to DSCA. Nevertheless, more importantly DOD has collaborated with FEMA in response and coordination of the FEMA's regions through the use of Homeland Response Force. The 10 Homeland Response Forces provide a regional response capability focused on planning, training and exercising, and forging strong links between the federal level and state and local authorities.

The National Response Framework (NRF) 2013 reaffirms the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official for domestic incident management.

⁸⁹Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, *FEMA's Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters* (Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, July 2010), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-101_Jul10.pdf (accessed June 30, 2013).

The Secretary coordinates preparedness activities within the U.S. to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. As part of these responsibilities, the Secretary coordinates with federal entities to provide for federal unity of effort for domestic incident management. The Secretary's responsibilities also include management of the broad emergency management and response authorities of FEMA.⁹⁰

Under NRF, FEMA coordinates assistance for incidents in which federal assistance is provided under the Stafford Act. The framework makes the FEMA Administrator the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council regarding emergency management. The FEMA Administrator's duties include assisting the President, through the Secretary of DHS, in carrying out the Stafford Act, operation of the National Response Coordination Center, the effective support of all Emergency Support Functions, and more generally, preparation for, protection against, response to, and recovery from all hazardous incidents. The FEMA Administrator is also responsible for managing the core DHS grant programs supporting homeland security activities.⁹¹

The NRF also discussed the Emergency Support Function Leaders Group, which comprises the federal departments and agencies that are designated as coordinators for Emergency Support Functions or coordinating agencies for other NRF annexes. FEMA leads the Emergency Support Function Leaders Group and is responsible for calling meetings and other administrative functions. The Emergency Support Function Leaders

⁹⁰Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 22.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 24, 47.

Group provides a forum for departments and agencies with roles in federal incident response to jointly address topics such as policies, preparedness, and training. FEMA's Regional Response Coordination Center includes 10 regional offices, each headed by a regional administrator. Each of FEMA's regional offices maintains a Regional Response Coordination Center. When activated, Regional Response Coordination Centers are multi-agency coordination centers staffed in anticipation of, or immediately following an incident. Operating under the direction of the FEMA Regional Administrator, the staff within the Regional Response Coordination Center coordinates federal regional response efforts and maintains connectivity with FEMA Headquarters and with state leadership.⁹²

The task of providing support to civil authorities is one of the specified missions of the DOD according to the 2013 Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. As part of the planning, DOD has established policy and procedures for DSCA and has made significant investments to improve DOD's response to requests for support from civil authorities. While FEMA, state, and local authorities have extensive emergency management capabilities, these organizations from time to time request DOD assistance, based on the scale of the incident and related response requirements. DOD support is primarily drawn from existing war fighting capabilities of the Armed Forces. Sometimes DOD's specialized war fighting capabilities, such as CBRNE and countering Improvised Explosive Devices are needed to support DSCA.⁹³

⁹²Ibid., 42.

⁹³Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), <http://www.defense.gov/news/Homelanddefensestrategy.pdf> (accessed September 24, 2013).

Strengthening our nation's preparedness and emergency response capabilities is the fourth strategic goal of the DHS according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, fiscal years 2008–2013, titled *One Team, One Mission, and Securing Our Homeland*.⁹⁴ The strategic plan highlights ensuring preparedness and strengthens response and recovery as the key measure performance for the fourth strategic goal. In the document, DHS graded FEMA as 97 percent of customers satisfied with individual recovery assistance. In percent of response teams reported at operational status, FEMA was rated at 100 percent.⁹⁵ The document also addressed ways the department is working to strengthen and unify DHS operations and management. This is achieved by improving interdepartmental governance and performance, creating advance intelligence and information sharing, and integrating DHS policy, planning, and operations coordination.⁹⁶

Interview

The researcher conducted a telephonic interview with Mr. Brian Ebert, the Operations and Planning Officer for ARNORTH. The interview was in regards to the conduct of FEMA and the coordination between FEMA and the Army in disaster relief operations. It is important to understand at this junction that ARNORTH is the Army Headquarters for DSCA. While NORTHCOM is the overarching DOD lead agent in

⁹⁴Department of Homeland Security, *One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008–2013*, <http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/67e98737-3bf6-4cff-bda1-78ee2061b2c3/DHSSStrategicPlan2008-2013.aspx> (accessed June 30, 2013).

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, 20.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 22-24.

DSCA, ARNORTH is the lead for Army support to DSCA. The purpose of the interview was to find out what actually happens during disaster relief operations, versus what is supposed to happen. Ebert shed light on the capabilities of FEMA and ARNORTH and discussed some of the primary means of sharing information between the different agencies responsible for disaster relief.

Summary

It is difficult to get an honest read as to the true state of FEMA from any source. While it is undeniable that since 2002 FEMA has been making steady growth, it is also very apparent that reoccurring problems and frequent mismanagement still exist. Numerous books, articles, and doctrines address the need and importance of unity of efforts in disaster relief operations. However, it is evident that these documents and articles, some presumably produced and published from lessons learned from the devastation during natural disasters, are inconclusive as to the true state of FEMA. Internal investigations conducted by the GAO and OIG continue to reiterate challenges within FEMA. Published articles and journals from prestigious organizations, like the Heritage Foundation, also acknowledge the challenges associated with FEMA's interagency collaboration and coordination. Several noted scholars and disaster relief experts have also weighed in on the challenges facing FEMA and they have recommended solutions to mitigate future shortfalls.

Thus far, available information confirms that even though the problems are identified and systems, laws, and regulations were developed to answer the problems, some stakeholders continue to resort back to old methods of doing business. Available data substantiates that FEMA and NORTHCOM recognize the existing problems and

shortfalls and the urgent need to rectify the situation before the next Katrina. Regardless of where the evidence is pointing, it will be unfair to determine the true state of FEMA and DSCA before all the evidence is properly tested.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

But to my country I want to say this: During this crisis you failed us. You looked down on us; you dismissed our victims; you dismissed us. You want our Jazz Fest, you want our Mardi Gras, and you want our cooking and our music. Then when you saw us in real trouble, when you saw a tiny minority preying on the weak among us, you called us ‘Sin City,’ and turned your backs. Well, we are a lot more than all that. And though we may seem the most exotic, the most atmospheric and, at times, the most downtrodden part of this land, we are still part of it. We are Americans. We are you.

— Anne Rice, *The New York Times*

The question for this research is to develop an understanding of what is the primary logistical role of the Army in support to civil authorities. The secondary questions include determining what are the logistical characteristics or type of support? What Army logistic organizations are equipped to provide support? What are the Army’s primary tasks?

This chapter outlines the methodology used to answer the primary question and secondary questions. The approach used by the researcher was qualitative research methodology as defined by John W. Creswell, in the second edition of *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*. The researcher used one approach during the study. This approach was qualitative narrative analysis. Narrative research methodology involves understanding written or spoken text giving an account of an event or series of events, chronologically connected.⁹⁷ The procedures for implementing this research consist of

⁹⁷Barbara Czarniawska, *Narratives in Social Science Research* (United Kingdom: SAGE Publications, 2004), <http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/narratives-in-social-science-research/n1.xml> (accessed May 12, 2013).

focusing on studying individuals, gathering data, and chronologically ordering the meaning of the data and experiences.⁹⁸

The research characteristic involves developing a narrative about past events regarding DSCA by using data analysis strategies. For this research methodology, the data collection format was primarily analyzing available articles, information, correspondence, military manuals, personal interviews, and data of key players in FEMA, U.S.NORTHCOM, and U.S. Southern Command. This research was conducted in the form of comprehensive discussion of the procedure and system for DSCA. The research identified cases of DSCA and the response to disaster relief support. These cases were bounded by time within a period from 1990 to 2010. For this research, the researcher looked at different literature categories and to a limited extent, the researcher used personal interviews from two U.S. Army field grade officers. The combined approach, document analysis and personal interviews, build upon each other and helped to frame the overall situational awareness and understanding of the purpose of the research. The researcher used extensive and multiple sources of information and provided a detailed in-depth picture of the topic. This approach also highlighted developed patterns that assisted in providing potential recommendations to the research, what is the primary logistical role of the Army in support to civil authorities, what are the logistical characteristics of support and organizations, what are the Army's primary tasks, and is there a way to make the process more efficient.

⁹⁸John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 2nd ed (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007), 54.

Research Method—Qualitative Narrative Analysis

The data collection methodology for this research focused on documents, archival material, and personal interviews.⁹⁹ The researcher reviewed the OIG report on FEMA; DHS report on FEMA's preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster; Congressional hearings on FEMA, and after action reports from FEMA supported disaster relief operations. The researcher spoke to two Army field grade officers who have been involved in DSCA missions. The officers shared their personal experiences from supporting disaster relief during Hurricane Katrina. While either officer is not a FEMA expert, they shared their personal knowledge and perspective from their interaction with FEMA during Katrina relief operations. Both officers spoke very candidly about the systemic challenges of getting all DSCA stakeholders to synchronize their efforts. The officers discussed how during the relief operation, it was difficult to implement unity of command, obtain and understand a common operating picture, and the inadequate training their unit received for DSCA.

The researcher also discussed ramifications, if the problem is not addressed in time before the next national incident. The research meticulously discussed the concept of DSCA and was able to present an understanding of the theory through this methodology. The language and experience from the two interviews, available data and information, was objective, while at the same time, it addressed this sensitive research effusively.

⁹⁹Ibid., 121.

Data Collection

Specific documents from different categories were carefully selected based on what the key proponent or organization had to accomplish with regards to DSCA.¹⁰⁰ Documents also relayed the overall theme of the category. Organizations like the GAO and OIG provided an unbiased evaluation. Reports generated out of FEMA Headquarters strengthened the importance of this research because the organization acknowledged that it had internal logistic challenges. The researcher spent extensive time conducting detailed study of the existing procedure within the defense agencies, with emphasis on the Army, NORTHCOM, Southern Command, and FEMA.

In Category 1—Military Doctrine and Standard Operating Procedures, a number of sources were chosen. Field Manual 3-28, *Civil Support Operations*, dated August 2010, explains how the Army conducts civil support operations. Field Manual 3-28 discusses the conduct of civil support operations, either in combination with offensive and defensive operations, or singly, in support of civil authorities. ADP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, dated July 2012, highlights the primary purpose of the Army, the primary characteristics, the Army organization, and the Army's primary tasks in military support to civil authorities. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, dated August 2011, JP 3-28, *Civil Support*, dated September 2007, and JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics* dated July 2008, were important sources for this research. These three documents highlight the importance of working in an interagency environment and the importance of striving for unity of effort. The *Joint Logistics* publication outlined critical strategic planning factors that could hinder timely response efforts. The selection of literature from different

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 120.

mediums was enough to produce an unbiased analysis and recommend a reasonable solution.

In Category 2—Federal Government Documents, the researcher analyzes available information about FEMA Logistics Supply Chain Management System to help validate some of the secondary questions. A chain of critical documentation and policy letters from organizations responsible for key tasks during disaster relief were examined. Some of the documentation and policy letters included the Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*; *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security*; *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*; *U.S. Northern Command's Role in Solving the Federal Government's Domestic Consequence Management Problem*; *FEMA's Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters*; *Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper*; and *U.S. Ground Force Capabilities Through 2020*.

Information is also available from the *Defense Support to Civil Authorities* handbooks. The DSCA Handbook *Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit* contains background information relative to the DSCA, including legal, doctrinal, and policy issues. It also covers an overview of incident management processes, including the NRF, National Incident Management System, and Incident Command System, as well as DHS organizations. It discusses civilian and military responses to a natural disaster. Included are the organization and command relationships involved in the DOD response to a disaster. The DSCA Handbook also contains information regarding planning factors for response to all hazardous events, review of safety, operational and composite risk management processes. Additionally, it contains the Concepts of Operation and details

five natural hazards and disasters and the pertinent planning factors for each within the scope of DSCA.

Data Analysis

The researcher spent extensive time managing all the relevant data needed for this research, identifying the relevant data in the proper context, interpreting the larger meaning of the data, and presenting a narrative that focus on the processes, theories, and general feature of the research.¹⁰¹ The researcher conducted a detailed study of the existing procedure within the defense agencies, with emphasis on the Army, NORTHCOM, Southern Command, and FEMA. The researcher began by determining an initial baseline of what was necessary to conduct civil and disaster relief operations. The researcher followed the initial baseline determination by comparing the baseline to the current procedure and then determining the depth of the problem.¹⁰² The researcher selected Hurricane Andrew, which was the first large scale DSCA operation to help set the benchmark on how effectively relief operations were executed. Hurricane Katrina was chosen as a litmus test to find out if the previous trends identified during Hurricane Andrew were corrected. Hurricane Sandy provided the latest assessment to determine if 20 years of recurring trends in DSCA were resolved. The list of documents provided the researcher with critical data input on the procedural challenges, the command effort and control, areas of emphasis, and the need for more coordination to resolve the problem. The examined documents were very straightforward, direct, and added more significance

¹⁰¹Ibid., 156.

¹⁰²Ibid., 157.

to the research. Even though the primary research method provided concentrated evidence for the research, a look at what was written on the research topic still needed to be addressed to solidify the researcher's proposed recommendations.

Forthright in the analysis, the questions were addressed and answered to help set the stage to highlight the problem statement and build on possible recommendations. The follow-on questions needed to have relevance, significance, and linkage to the problem statement and to the main research topic. There were three additional questions addressed in this research. These questions ranged from determining what are the logistical characteristics or type of support? What Army logistic organizations are equipped to provide support? What are the Army's primary tasks?

Summary

In conducting this research, the researcher focused on answering the primary and secondary questions. The researcher collected data about the significant issues related to DSCA and developed a chronology that connects different phases and aspects of the system.¹⁰³ The primary research consisted of better understanding of DSCA Army logistics. The researcher determined an initial baseline of what was necessary to conduct civil and disaster relief operations and followed the baseline determination by comparing the baseline to the current procedure and then determining the depth of the problem. The researcher used Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Sandy as case studies.

¹⁰³Ibid., 215.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.

— General Robert H. Barrow, Commandant, USMC,
noted in a 1980 Speech

This chapter highlights key points noted during the three preceding chapters. The chapter provides an answer to the primary question, what is the primary logistical role of the Army in DSCA. In addition, the chapter provides answers to the follow-on questions what are the logistical characteristics or type of support and what are the Army's primary tasks? The answers to all the questions are based on the pool of literature reviewed in chapter 2. Chapter 4 utilizes the research methodology discussed in chapter 3 and used it to answer the primary question and secondary questions. The analysis was based on the qualitative research methodology as defined by John W. Creswell, in the second edition of *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*.¹⁰⁴ Narrative research methodology involves understanding written or spoken text giving an account of an event or series of events, chronologically connected. The procedures for implementing this research consists of focusing on studying documents, gathering data, and chronologically ordering the meaning of the data, documents, and experiences.

The analysis was characterized by developing a narrative about past events regarding DSCA, using data analysis strategies. For this analysis, the data collection format was analyzing available articles, information, military manuals, and data from two

¹⁰⁴Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*.

of the key stakeholders, FEMA, and U.S. NORTHCOM. This research was conducted in the form of comprehensive discussion of the procedure and the system for DSCA.

The analysis identified cases of DSCA and the response to disaster relief support. These cases were bound by time within a period from 1990 to 2010. For this analysis, the researcher looked at different literature categories. The approach for this analysis builds upon each other, and helped to frame the overall situational awareness and understanding of the purpose of this chapter. This chapter also highlights and develops patterns that assisted in providing potential recommendations to the research questions. What is the primary logistical role of the Army in support to civil authorities? What are the logistical characteristics of Army support pertaining to DSCA? Moreover, what are the Army's primary tasks? This chapter concludes with determining if there is a need to make the process more efficient.

Research Analysis

Beginning in March 2013, the researcher discussed with a number of Army logisticians and people with knowledge of Army support to civil authorities, as to whether the primary research question of this research is still relevant. The question for this research is what is the primary logistical role of the Army in DSCA? With the recent memories of the devastation caused by Hurricane Sandy in the northeastern U.S. in October 2012, the overwhelming response was positive.¹⁰⁵ The unanimous response from

¹⁰⁵Jennifer Abbey, "How to Help Hurricane Sandy Victims," *ABC News*, October 30, 2012, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-sandy-victims/story?id=17598687> (accessed September 2, 2013).

the researcher's inquiry regarding the research question determined that there is a continuous need to examine Army logistics support to civil authorities.

The researcher initiated the research based on the assumption that the current plans, policies, and procedures require improvements. The researcher's analysis of available documents, after action reports, and causal discussions with two Army field grade officers, with experience in supporting natural disaster relief operations during Hurricane Katrina, highlighted concerns about NORTHCOM. Based on the analysis of the information mentioned above the researcher believes that the current plans, policies, and procedures need upgrading. As reported in the Heritage Foundation Report, NORTHCOM needs properly trained people, a sufficient number of people with the necessary equipment and the ability to rapidly execute operational plans for overall military defense of U.S. Homeland and DSCA.¹⁰⁶ NORTHCOM's inability to consolidate its support with FEMA's contributing efforts hinder interagency unity of efforts and the ability for the two key players to collaborate on supply management activities. To highlight this point, FEMA made no mention of the importance of interagency cooperation with NORTHCOM in its FEMA Publication 1.¹⁰⁷ FEMA, as the federal lead agency for disaster relief operations, and NORTHCOM, the DOD lead agency, must collaborate and integrate their resources and manpower in order to deliver efficient disaster relief support. In order to employ Army logistical support in disaster relief operations, FEMA must coordinate its Army logistical requirements through

¹⁰⁶McHale, *Critical Mismatch*.

¹⁰⁷Department of Homeland Security, *The Federal Emergency Management Agency Publication 1* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, November 2010).

NORTHCOM. FEMA's failure in acknowledging the importance of NORTHCOM's contribution in relief operations highlights the importance of interagency cooperation.

The researcher reviewed documentation regarding the conduct of FEMA and the coordination between FEMA and the Army in disaster relief operations. While NORTHCOM is the overarching DOD lead agent in DSCA, U.S. ARNORTH is the lead for Army support to DSCA. The purpose of the document review was to find out what actually happens during disaster relief operations, versus what is supposed to happen. The document shed light on the capabilities of FEMA and NORTHCOM and discussed some of the primary means of sharing information between the different agencies responsible for disaster relief.

In answering the primary question of this research, a number of additional questions were raised. These additional questions need to be addressed and answered in order to fully appreciate the essence of the primary question. The secondary questions include, what are the logistical characteristics or type of support, and what are the Army's primary tasks in support of DSCA? In the next few pages, the researcher will attempt to answer these questions. The foundation for this chapter is the numerous literature reviews conducted in the course of this research. The majority of the information is geared towards answering the primary question and the secondary questions covering the conduct of Army logistics support to disaster relief operations. Additionally, the data presented deals with the challenges faced by the two key stakeholders in disaster relief operations, NORTHCOM and FEMA. The research looks at the problem of synchronization, coordination, and creating a COP for disaster relief operations.

Characteristics of Army support

The characteristics of Army logistical support to DSCA is divided into four complimentary sections. Principally, the roles of civilian organizations and the relationship of military forces to federal, state, tribal, and local agencies are different. The differences are pronounced enough to define a different task set for Army forces other than offense, defense, or stability. The support provided by Army forces depends on specific circumstances dictated by law. While every domestic support mission is unique, four defining characteristics shape the actions of Army logistical support to civil authorities. These characteristics include that state and federal laws define how the Army provides support to civil authorities; it emphasizes that civil authorities are in charge and Army forces support them; all Army forces must depart when civil authorities are able to continue without Army support; and Army forces must document costs of all direct and indirect support provided.¹⁰⁸

State and federal laws define how the Army provides support to civil authorities and almost every aspect of DSCA. These laws circumscribe what Active Duty, National Guard forces may do, and from whom they take direction. Depending on their duty status, laws prohibit many soldiers from undertaking certain missions, especially those associated with law enforcement. Laws also specify professional requirements for skills such as religious support. For example, unless waived by legal authority, laws restrict Army Chaplains from conducting religious support for civilians outside the DOD.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

A number of laws, policies, directives, regulations, and doctrines govern the Army's response to domestic disaster relief. Among the pertinent laws are the Stafford Act,¹¹⁰ the Economy Act,¹¹¹ and the Posse Comitatus Act.¹¹² The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act established the statutory framework for federal emergency relief operations. Under the umbrellas of this act, the President, at the behest of the governor, can declare an emergency or major disaster in the affected state. Once made, the declaration opens the way for extensive federal assistance to the state and local governments. The Act also authorizes the President to direct DOD assistance to disaster areas. Additionally, the President can direct DOD to perform emergency assistance for up to 10 days without making an emergency or disaster declaration.¹¹³

The Economy Act authorizes federal agencies to purchase goods and services from another federal agency, if they cannot be obtained more cheaply through open purchase or contract. Congress passed this law in 1932 to eliminate duplication and waste within the Federal Government. It applies to disaster response situations because other federal agencies can request this support from DOD even if the President has not declared

¹¹⁰Department of Homeland Security, *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as Amended and Related Authorities* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2007), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/stafford_act.pdf (accessed September 17, 2013).

¹¹¹*The Economy Act 1932, Economy Act Agreements for Purchasing Goods or Services*, <http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/mou-economyact.pdf> (accessed September 17, 2013).

¹¹²*The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878*, Title 18-Crimes and Criminal Procedure, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title18/pdf/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap67-sec1385.pdf> (accessed September 17, 2013).

¹¹³Department of Homeland Security, *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as Amended and Related Authorities*.

an emergency. An Economy Act purchase is permitted only if the funding for the purchase is actually available. Additionally, the purchase is permitted in the best interest of the government, the ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract from a commercial enterprise, and the agency or unit to fill the order is able to provide or get by contract the ordered goods or services.¹¹⁴

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 limits the use of Active Duty and Army Reserve forces to act within the U.S., especially for law enforcement duties.¹¹⁵ This act specifically prohibits all Title 10 troops from assisting with domestic law enforcement activities. However, the law does not apply to National Guard Soldiers on state Active Duty or in a Title 32 status. Under the Posse Comitatus Act, National Guard Soldiers are allowed to assist with local law enforcement authorities.¹¹⁶ However, under the Insurrection Act of 1807, the President has the authority to use federal troops to suppress insurrection and domestic violence. Thus, the President can use Title 10 forces to perform law enforcement missions if he chooses to invoke the Insurrection Act.¹¹⁷

In addition, a number of relevant policies and directives relate to disaster relief operations. President Bush's Executive Order 12656 of 2003 placed FEMA under the

¹¹⁴*The Economy Act 1932.*

¹¹⁵Colonel Deborah L. Geiger, "Posse Comitatus, The Army, and Homeland Security What Is the Proper Balance?" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 2006).

¹¹⁶*The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878.*

¹¹⁷Legal Information Institute, "10 USC § 332 - Use of Militia and Armed Forces to Enforce Federal Authority," Cornell University Law School, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/332> (accessed September 9, 2013).

newly established DHS.¹¹⁸ Simultaneously, Bush also issued HSPD 5, to help enhance the ability of the U.S. to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single comprehensive national incident management system.¹¹⁹ The goal of HSPD 5 is to ensure that all levels of government have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to domestic incident management.¹²⁰ HSPD 5 directs the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to support domestic relief operations when instructed to do so by the President. Nevertheless, it also emphasizes that the SECDEF retains command and control over the military, even when operating in support of the DSCA during a disaster relief operation.¹²¹

Another aspect of HSPD 5 was the development of a National Response Plan that integrated Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all discipline, all hazards plan.¹²² The National Response Plan replaced the older federal response system. Since 2003, the National Response Plan is a way of doing business; it is an all hazard, multi-disciplined, cross-jurisdictional way of

¹¹⁸Department of Homeland Security, Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65, *Federal Executive Branch Continuity of Operation (COOP)* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2004), http://www.fema.gov/pdf/library/fpc65_0604.pdf (accessed September 17, 2013).

¹¹⁹Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5* 39, no. 10 (March 20, 2002): 280-285, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=439105> (accessed September 17, 2013).

¹²⁰*Ibid.*

¹²¹*Ibid.*

¹²²Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*.

standardized, predictable practices and procedures for the Federal Government to work with the state, local, and tribal governments in the private sector to protect the nation.¹²³

In addition to the Federal statutes and policies on disaster relief, there are also several DOD Directives on the subject of DSCA. DOD Directive 3025.1, formerly Military Support to Civil Authorities now DSCA, provides the overall framework of the DOD disaster relief operations.¹²⁴ Under this directive, the Secretary of the Army serves as the executive agent responsible for responding to all requests for military assistance. The directive makes DOD resources available for civil support operations as long as civilian resources are applied first, the request is for assistance beyond the capabilities of civilian responders, and DOD resources are used efficiently. It also recognizes the primacy of the National Guard in civil support operations and having primary responsibility for providing DOD assistance to state, local, and tribal governments in disaster relief. Furthermore, it authorizes military action in instances of imminent situations that require immediate response by Army forces in order to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property.¹²⁵

The backbone of DSCA is the joint manuals and doctrine. The joint publications serve as a basic framework to synchronize efforts to accomplish the DSCA missions. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, and JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, are strategic publications that lay out basic functions and guidance to establish a common

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, January 1993, <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=385> (accessed September 17, 2013).

¹²⁵Ibid.

operating picture for joint military and interagency logistics planning operations. JP 3-0, 3-7, and 4-0 are foundation manuals that describe fundamental planning considerations and requirements to synchronize joint interagency operations. These manuals maintain that the key to mission accomplishment is establishing a unified action under one unified command. Unified action is the “synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.”¹²⁶

In JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, chapter 5 discusses joint operations in DSCA. For DSCA operations, DOD supports but does not supplant civil authorities within a state, that state’s governor is the key decision maker for DSCA.¹²⁷ JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, introduces homeland defense operations, command relationships, and interagency responsibilities. It describes air, land, maritime, and space operations in the context of homeland defense, and it outlines other supporting homeland defense operations and enabling activities.¹²⁸ JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, is the keystone document for joint logistics. As such, it provides overarching joint doctrine on logistic support to joint operations, to include DSCA.¹²⁹

Army Techniques Publications 3-28.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil Authorities and Integrating with National Guard Civil Support*, identifies multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for DSCA

¹²⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*

¹²⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-27.

¹²⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 4-0.

operations and the integration of the National Guard in civil support.¹³⁰ Army Techniques Publications 3-28.1 is a joint framework manual co-written by the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force. It highlights the necessity of unity of efforts amongst the different services in the conduct of DSCA.

Army Doctrine Publication 4-0 and ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, supports ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. These principle level manuals focus on how the elements of sustainment (logistics, personnel services, and health services) support operational mission accomplishment by Army forces. “It serves as the doctrinal bridge fostering the understanding of the seamless nature and essential linkages of sustainment capabilities from the strategic base to tactical level operations.”¹³¹ Under Unified Action, ADRP 3-0 and ADP 3-0 discuss the importance of synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and non-governmental agencies with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Both manuals highlight the significance of synchronized actions of military, government agencies, non-governmental agencies, intergovernmental agencies, and the private sectors to achieve unity of effort. ADRP 3-0 also discusses how the Army conducts and participates in interagency coordination, using strategic communication and public diplomacy. The integration and strategic communication is pivotal at all levels of the Army commands. Subordinate commanders also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces, government agencies, non-governmental agencies, intergovernmental agencies, and the private sectors. Additionally, activities of the state

¹³⁰ Air Land Sea Application, ATP 3-28.1.

¹³¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 4-0.

authority, local authority, and the populace should be considered. This consideration is important because a significant goal of unified action is coordination to build the capacity of partners. In addition, ADRP 3-0 discusses the value of cooperation with civilian authorities and joint forces during combined operations.¹³²

Army Core Competency is demonstrated through decisive action. One tenet of the Army Decisive Action includes DSCA. As part of its core competency, Army forces must be able to conduct offensive, defensive, and DSCA operations simultaneously. For maximum effectiveness, tasks for DSCA require dedicated training similar to training for offensive and defensive tasks. According to ADRP 3-0, DSCA is support provided by Active Duty forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces. DSCA support is in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies and law enforcement. DSCA support to civil authorities is always conducted in support of FEMA, the lead federal agency.¹³³

Army Doctrine Publication 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* and ADRP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* build on the doctrinal foundation established for the Army's contribution to DSCA. Both manuals explain how the Army, including all components, conducts DSCA missions and National Guard civil support missions as part of unified land operations. ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28 focus on achieving unity of effort among the Army Battalions, Brigades, Division Headquarters, and Army Service

¹³²Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), US Army at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) (accessed October 28, 2013).

¹³³*Ibid.*

Component Commands conducting DSCA. ADP 3-28 applies to the Active Duty Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. However, this manual does not apply to certain Army organizations and activities that support DSCA. For example, when state Army National Guard is in support of state disaster relief activities, their status falls outside the definition of DSCA. Finally, ADP 3-28 does not apply to military activities conducted wholly within any military installation in the U.S. and it does not apply to the United States Army Corps of Engineers although, the Corps of Engineers plays a significant role in DSCA.¹³⁴

The US Army's DSCA doctrine is guided by four basic tenets. Unless homeland defense considerations take precedent, the Army will provide civil support assistance during times of crisis. The SECDEF retains control of all military forces and FEMA mission assignments will be treated as requests that can be denied if they do not meet the criteria in DOD 3025.15.¹³⁵ In addition, the Army will focus on satisfying unfulfilled requirements; ensuring resources at the tribal, local, and state levels are used first.¹³⁶ Furthermore, first responders will use their core competencies to assist their fellow citizens. Soldiers have a broad range of skills, honed in many settings that may prove useful during civil support operations, although Army logistics is probably the most desired skill.¹³⁷ Finally, Army assistance is temporary. Early in the relief operation,

¹³⁴Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹³⁵James Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009).

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷*Ibid.*

objectives should be set and end states identified so that the recovery mission can be turned over to civil authorities.¹³⁸

In DSCA, Army forces support a primary or lead civilian agency, but the command of Army units' remains within the Army chain of command. While the mission may constitute a specific military task, Army leaders need to realize that they achieve the military end state once civil authorities become able to provide effective support to their citizens, without further assistance from the Army. One of the biggest mistakes that tactical commanders can make is to assume they need to take charge upon arrival at the scene of an incident.¹³⁹

On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit Florida near Homestead (south of Miami) at dawn with winds clocked at nearly 140 miles per hour. When the winds finally died down, the path of devastation was clear. There were palm trees and downed power and telephone lines blocking the streets. An estimated 250,000 people were left homeless. In Dade County alone, one out of every 10 people was left homeless. President George H. Bush promptly declared four Florida counties disaster areas.¹⁴⁰ For command and control of federal military forces during the relief operation, a Joint Task Force (JTF) was established. This was the first large scale deployment of a JTF in support of hurricane response operations. Major General Thomas B. Arwood, Deputy Chief of Staff for

¹³⁸Ibid.

¹³⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹⁴⁰General Jimmy D. Ross, U.S. Army, Retired, "The Role of the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Group in the Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations" (Logistics Issues Research (LIR) Monograph, Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command, 1995), <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=474728> (accessed September 5, 2013).

Logistic Army Materiel Command, was selected to be the JTF Commander.¹⁴¹ In order to achieve unity of command, the JTF was tasked with maintaining command and control of all assigned federal military forces.

In the Hurricane Fran disaster relief operation, the lack of COP and unity of command was evident. In this relief operation, the failure of COP and unity of command can be attributed to both FEMA and the DOD. In support of the disaster relief operation, President Bill Clinton authorized federal disaster assistance under the Stafford Act for 10 counties in the State of North Carolina, in September 1996.¹⁴² The Presidential declaration was based on a request from the state governor, Governor Hunt. During Hurricane Fran relief operations, the initial pre-disaster coordination between all stakeholders worked well. After the storm made landfall coordination became a problem. As part of the disaster preparedness plans, twice daily briefings were to be provided to FEMA by the Hurricane Liaison Team.¹⁴³ However, once Hurricane Fran was over land, Hurricane Liaison Team daily briefings to FEMA concerning the impacts of the storm became less frequent and an increasing number of stakeholders were not included in the briefings. For example, the conference calls between Eastern Region Headquarters and FEMA did not include the Army, who was providing command and control of Active

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Federal Emergency Management Agency, *FEMA-Situation Report 5: Hurricane Fran*, September 1996, <http://reliefweb.int/report/united-states-america/fema-situation-report-5-hurricane-fran> (accessed October 29, 2013).

¹⁴³U.S. Department of Commerce, "Hurricane Fran," July 1997, <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/pdfs/franrpt.pdf> (accessed November 9, 2013).

Duty forces out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina.¹⁴⁴ These situations set in motion the lack of COP that created a lasting shadow over the relief operation.

In addition to the federal disaster declaration in North Carolina, the President also declared federal disaster areas in some counties in Virginia at the behest of the state governor, Governor Allen.¹⁴⁵ In both disaster declarations, a Federal Coordinating Officer was appointed to coordinate all FEMA relief activities. However, although these were neighboring states, there was limited coordination of relief efforts between the two FEMA Federal Coordinating Officers.¹⁴⁶ The absence of the unity of command was evident as no overarching administrator was appointed by FEMA to oversee the relief efforts in both states. Customarily, this responsibility would have fallen on the leadership of the Eastern Region Headquarters.

In addition, the Active Duty forces supporting the relief operation in both states were under the control of two different commands. DOD support was also more convoluted due to relief operation requirements being accomplished with cross-installation and cross-command resources. For example, Fort Bragg, North Carolina was the principal mobilization center for receiving and distributing disaster relief resources, while Fort Jackson, South Carolina, served as the staging area. There was no direct command and control in place to synchronize the activities of the staging base with that of the distribution base. Instead of a unified Task Force to command and control the DOD support, the DOD Emergency Operations Center at Forces Command, Fort

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Federal Emergency Management Agency, *FEMA-Situation Report 5*.

¹⁴⁶U.S. Department of Commerce, "Hurricane Fran."

McPherson, Georgia, and the Headquarters of the First United States Army, Fort Gillem, Georgia, both served as DOD relief operation headquarters.¹⁴⁷

To a limited, but essential extent, there were problems with a lack of sufficient equipment to adequately support the disaster relief operations. In addition, the distribution of available equipment varied widely among counties. For example, Wilmington, North Carolina, initially had access to only 40 percent of the required equipment. In contrast, Morehead, North Carolina, had more than adequate equipment. While it is arguable whether this was a problem of equipment shortage or COP, the lack of COP on the part of most stakeholders, magnified the equipment shortages.¹⁴⁸

In the days following the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the number of soldiers, sailors, and airmen in support of the disaster relief increased dramatically to more than 72,000. They brought with them 346 helicopters, 68 fixed-wing aircraft, and numerous trucks and other vehicles.¹⁴⁹ On August 31, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Steven Blum asked other states to send whatever aid they could to Louisiana; there were more than 15,000 National Guard Soldiers and Airmen in Louisiana and Mississippi. On September 7, a week after Blum made his appeal; there were almost 46,000 Guardsmen in both states, a fourfold increase in the number of National Guard troops in the region.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, there were about 2,000 Active Duty personnel in the two states providing support on August 31. A week later, more than

¹⁴⁷Federal Emergency Management Agency, *FEMA-Situation Report 5*.

¹⁴⁸U.S. Department of Commerce, "Hurricane Fran."

¹⁴⁹Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*

18,000 Title 10 Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen were involved in the relief operation. Active component support peaked at 22,000 on September 12. Those were unprecedented levels of support for the disaster relief operation.¹⁵¹

In the meantime, there were problems associated with establishing and synchronizing civil authorities as the lead agency in charge of the disaster relief. During the Katrina relief operation, as the number of Active Duty and National Guard forces grew, the operation devolved into three separate operations. President Bush tried to achieve unity of command during the relief operation by advising Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco to request federalization of the National Guard. Blanco's opposition to federalizing the state National Guard and her rejection of Bush's offer to appoint an Active Duty Officer instead of using a state National Guard Officer as a dual-status commander highlighted the clash between federal and state philosophies. Nevertheless, Hurricane Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans constituted the first missed opportunity for NORTHCOM and the National Guard to demonstrate the utility of a National Guard dual-status command for a no-notice event. The added consequence of not federalizing the National Guard was the inability of the Katrina relief operation to establish a unity of command for the operation.¹⁵²

Thus, three separate operations evolved. In Louisiana, all National Guard forces operated under the command of Task Force Pelican, which controlled all assets and dispersed them to subordinate task units upon request. The National Guard Bureau sent a divisional headquarters to Louisiana to help with command and control. The 35th

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Ibid.

Infantry Division (Task Force Santa Fe) did not have operational control over all of the forces operating in its area of operations, so it focused on providing logistics and other support to the parish task forces. Individual task forces coordinated their efforts with the civilian authorities, relief agencies, National Guard units, and active component forces operating in their areas. Mississippi used the divisional headquarters sent to that state in a much different manner.¹⁵³ The 38th Infantry Division (Task Force Cyclone) controlled all units in the state and reported directly to the state Adjutant General. Finally, the Active component (JTF Katrina) commanded by Lieutenant General Honoré, provided support to both states, but with focus on New Orleans.¹⁵⁴

To highlight the problem of unity of command, during his report before congress Lieutenant General Blum said, “With few exceptions, the National Guard Joint Task Force elements had significant command and control difficulties while trying to respond to the disaster. These difficulties were compounded with the deployment of Title 10 forces” in other words, Active Duty forces in the Joint Area of Operations, a lack of command and control coordination, and poor communications between Title 10 and Title 32 forces were significant issues.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴Lynne Duke, “The Category 5 General,” *Washington Post*, September 12, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/11/AR2005091101484.html> (accessed June 29, 2013).

¹⁵⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, *Senate Hearing 109-813, before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate*, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., February 2006 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg27028/html/CHRG-109shrg27028.htm> (accessed September 21, 2013).

In the overall response to Hurricane Katrina, separate command structures for Active Duty Military and the National Guard hindered their unity of effort. NORTHCOM commanded Active Duty forces, while each State Government commanded its National Guard forces. For the first two days of Katrina response operations, NORTHCOM did not have situational awareness of what forces the National Guard had on the ground. JTF Katrina simply could not operate at full efficiency when it lacked visibility of over half the military forces in the disaster area. Neither the Louisiana National Guard nor JTF Katrina had a good sense for where each other's forces were located or what they were doing. For example, the JTF Katrina Engineering Directorate had not been able to coordinate with National Guard forces in the New Orleans area. As a result, some units were not immediately assigned missions that matched the on-the-ground requirements. Further, FEMA requested assistance from DOD without knowing what State National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the same needs. In addition, the Commanding General of JTF Katrina and the Adjutant Generals (TAGs) of Louisiana and Mississippi had only a coordinating relationship, with no formal command relationship established. All this resulted in confusion over roles and responsibilities between National Guard and Federal forces and highlights the need for a more unified command structure.¹⁵⁶

The many logistical challenges during Hurricanes Andrew, Fran, and Katrina shed light on the problems interagencies face in disaster relief operations.¹⁵⁷ The continuous trends that emerged from disaster relief operations were the lack of accountability,

¹⁵⁶White House, "Chapter Five: Lessons Learned, 'Hurricane Katrina Critical Challenges,'" September 2005, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html> (accessed September 21, 2013).

¹⁵⁷McHale, *Critical Mismatch*.

absence of unity of command, and the inability to create a COP.¹⁵⁸ Mr. Frances Townsend, President Bush's domestic security adviser, in his 2006 report on Hurricane Katrina highlighted the appropriateness of the state Joint Force Headquarters. Townsend recommended Joint Force Headquarters serving as a logical platform for hosting a common operating picture and acting as headquarters for coordinated civilian—military unity of effort, in future domestic disaster responses.¹⁵⁹

Army units complete their missions and redeploy in the least amount of time needed by civil authorities; the time needed to resume providing needed support to the citizens and carry on the response. The military end state for domestic support missions is based solely on the capability of civil authorities to discharge their responsibilities without further Army support. As soon as that threshold is achieved, commanders report it to the supported agency through the chain of command. The measures of effectiveness should be based on civilian capability to perform tasks unaided by Army support.¹⁶⁰

While most natural disasters are predictable due to advanced meteorological technology, the majority of man-made disasters are not foreseeable; this technology makes it possible to predetermine the categories of most hurricanes. Predictions of an impending disaster should signal FEMA and other civil authorities to begin pre-impact activities. Once a disaster strikes, these agencies coordinate the implementation of a coordinated action plan to address local needs. In accordance with *Civil Support and the*

¹⁵⁸Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*.

¹⁵⁹Eric Lipton, "White House Report Advises Revamping Disaster Response," *The New York Times*, February 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/politics/23katrina.html?_r=0 (accessed September 21, 2013).

¹⁶⁰Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

U.S. Army: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Civil Support and the U.S. Army, Phase IV (Stabilize) begins with Active Duty forces scaling down operations and the civil authorities resume new normal activities. This phase ends when redeployment criteria for Active Duty forces have been met. Phase V (Transition) starts when all response forces begin redeployment and operational control transfers to the designated command, usually FEMA.¹⁶¹

As in combat operations, the desired military end state in disaster relief operations is for Active Duty forces to create a stable environment in which the local authorities could reassume control. Only when this stable environment has been created could Active Duty forces redeploy to their home station. In developing metrics to measure the progress in Hurricane Katrina relief operations, the assigned Active Duty Brigades had to articulate green—amber—red levels in each area with multiple sub-levels of amber that recognized the incremental progress of restoration in the individual categories.¹⁶² The brigades identified what it determined to be the achievable military end state in each area. Rather than require that conditions in Louisiana be restored to pre-hurricane standards, represented by a green rating, across the board prior to redeployment of the brigades, the consensus was that, in some areas, amber ratings demonstrated sufficient progress to

¹⁶¹Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Civil Support and the U.S. Army: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, December 2009).

¹⁶²Michael Donahue, “Title 10 Domestic Humanitarian Assistance: New Orleans,” *Military Review* (May-June 2008): 49-57.

enable civil authorities to resume command and control, and civic leaders could restore services to green themselves.¹⁶³

For example, during the Katrina relief operations, the Active Duty Unit responsible for Algiers, Louisiana, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, presented an assessment that enough progress had been made in the area and it was possible for civilian authorities to take the mission from the brigade. In a briefing by 2nd Brigade Commander to the division commander and local New Orleans officials on the status of Algiers, the commander concluded that progress was to the point where local law enforcement could maintain law and order without Active Duty assistance.¹⁶⁴ The brigade assessed that essential services and infrastructure were restored to the point that local officials could resume pre-hurricane daily operations. Furthermore, the brigade recommended that the area be handed over to a smaller contingent of forces of National Guard.¹⁶⁵

All Army units engaged in DSCA maintain a detailed record of operations cost for direct expenditures. Supported civilian authorities must reimburse DOD for the cost of any support provided by the Army. All federal military support is provided on a reimbursable basis unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Cost reimbursement for DSCA is usually according to section 1535 of Title 31, United States Code (commonly called the Economy Act), which mandates cost reimbursement by the federal agency requesting military support. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

and Emergency Assistance Act (commonly known as the Stafford Act) set the guidelines for reimbursements from federal funds to federal agencies and states. Federal law also mandates that the states reimburse FEMA for a portion (usually 25 percent) of any request for assistance passed to the federal level. This translates into unit requirements to submit documentation of exactly what support state and federal military forces provided.¹⁶⁶

The Stafford Act provides that state and local governments will share the cost of disaster relief assistance provided by the Federal Government. In general, state and local governments pay 25 percent of the costs, and the federal government pays 75 percent.¹⁶⁷ In the 2007 United States Government Accountability Office report to congress on DHS and FEMA, the GAO reported that they found examples where FEMA's assistance to disaster relief left the Federal Government vulnerable to fraud and abuse.¹⁶⁸ According to the report, GAO estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about \$600 million to \$1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply assistance.¹⁶⁹ With that as the background, the importance of Army forces documenting costs of all direct and indirect support provided during DSCA takes on added significance.

¹⁶⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹⁶⁷McCarthy, RL33053, *Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance*.

¹⁶⁸U.S. Congress, House, GAO 07-1142T, *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security*.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*

During the 1992 Hurricane Andrew relief operations, DOD reported about 22,800 Active Duty personnel in south Florida and Louisiana.¹⁷⁰ Although, National Guard forces were activated by each state governor and played major roles in all disaster areas, a high number of Active Duty forces were necessary to accomplish disaster relief operations. The issue that arose from the use of Active Duty forces during this disaster relief operation concerns reimbursement to the military for costs incurred in responding to this catastrophic disaster. The DOD discovered, after the fact, that unless the President declares a disaster and a tasking is received from FEMA, federal agencies generally will not be reimbursed for costs incurred in preparing for or providing disaster assistance. According to the Stafford Act, any pre-declaration preparations cost accrued by the DOD is at risk of not being reimbursable because the Act does not explicitly authorize such actions.¹⁷¹ Consequently, in the absence of a Presidential disaster declaration and a mission tasking from FEMA, DOD must carefully articulate who is responsible for the cost of its pre-disaster preparation and mobilization.

In 1992, DOD estimated that the cost of assistance provided in disaster locations during that year amounted to about \$559 million.¹⁷² However, that estimate does not

¹⁷⁰General Accounting Office, *Disaster Assistance DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew, Iniki, Qphoon, and Omar* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, June 1993), <http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/217920.pdf> (accessed September 24, 2013).

¹⁷¹Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), <http://www.defense.gov/news/Homelanddefensestrategy.pdf> (accessed September 24, 2013).

¹⁷²General Accounting Office, *Disaster Assistance DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew, Iniki, Qphoon, and Omar*.

represent the actual total cost, only the incremental costs incurred for such things as temporary lodging, debris removal, airlift, and subsistence items. From the total cost of \$559 million, DOD is only reimbursed for the incremental costs incurred. Consequently, DOD military and civilian personnel costs are not included under the rationale that these are fixed costs that would have been incurred regardless of whether or not the personnel were involved in providing disaster assistance.¹⁷³ All Army units engaged in DSCA must maintain a detailed record of cost in support of DSCA. In an effort to highlight the importance of proper documentation of cost of supporting disaster relief, the February 2013, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support for Civil Authorities*, emphasizes cost effective policy. In addition to proper documentation of cost, another strategy is for the use of Active Duty forces closest to the point of disaster in order to reduce costs.¹⁷⁴

The Army's Primary Tasks

To understand the Army's involvement in DSCA, we must first understand the rationale for Army support in disaster relief operations. Army units supporting civil authorities in DSCA operations are guided by three core purposes, which are save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property.¹⁷⁵ Army forces have four primary tasks associated with the conduct of DSCA operations. These four tasks are provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Department of Defense, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.

¹⁷⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-28.

Nuclear (CBRN) incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support.¹⁷⁶

Army forces provide support for domestic disasters when natural and manmade disasters occur throughout the U.S. and its territories. For some disasters, there are advance warnings (such as hurricanes, ice storms, or volcanic eruptions). In situations where advance warning is pertinent, DHS through FEMA mobilize available support before disasters and assists local, tribal, and state officials with evacuation plans and recovery.¹⁷⁷ Other disasters, such as an earthquake or a chemical accident, usually provide no warning. Emergency services and law enforcement at every level respond according to prior planning and the availability of resources. Military response to disaster relief occurs at four levels. Where state governor's call up National Guard forces in support of relief operations and after a declaration by the President. Presidential declaration of a disaster is based on a national declaration by the President, or upon the request from the governor of the affected state. Additionally, at the direction of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, military forces will provide capabilities not assigned to combatant commanders and through immediate response authority, which specifies certain conditions allowing military support in urgent situations.¹⁷⁸ As a whole, most domestic disasters require no federal military assistance. State and federal emergency management agencies receive the military assistance needed from the National Guard. In a major catastrophe, the demand for resources may exceed National

¹⁷⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

Guard capacity, even with assistance from other states. In such situations, Regular Army forces provide support as required through NORTHCOM.¹⁷⁹

During Hurricane Katrina disaster relief operations, Active Duty military and National Guard personnel provided critical emergency response and security support to the Gulf Coast at the height of the crisis. State Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard forces that deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi operated under the command of their respective governors. On the other hand, Active Duty military fell under the command of the President and had more limited civil response authority. By September 1, 2005, JTF Katrina, commanded by Lieutenant General Honoré, included approximately 3,000 Active Duty personnel in the disaster area. Within four days, that number climbed to 14,232 Active Duty personnel. Honoré's leadership, combined with DOD's resources, manpower, and advanced planning, contributed to the military's success in the Federal response, especially in areas such as search and rescue, security, and logistical support.¹⁸⁰

Army forces provide support for CBRN mitigation during disaster relief operations. Much of the NRF focuses on responding to accidental or deliberate CBRN.¹⁸¹ While not every CBRN threat is terrorist related, or manmade, preparation for terrorist attacks predominates because of the increasing threat from terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction. In the event of an attack with a weapon of mass destruction or a CBRN incident, federal military and state National Guard forces would provide

¹⁷⁹Ibid.

¹⁸⁰White House, "Chapter Four: A Week of Crisis (August 29–September 5)," <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter4.html> (accessed September 9, 2013).

¹⁸¹Department of Homeland Security, *National Response Framework*.

specialized capabilities and general purpose capabilities and resources. Additionally, pandemic disease outbreaks fall under DSCA task.¹⁸² To ensure the Army maintains its expertise in CBRN, Vibrant Response exercises are conducted annually. The exercise conducted by NORTHCOM and led by ARNORTH, is an annual event and is the country's largest CBRN exercise. The training exercise is used to evaluate military unit's operational and tactical ability to support civil authorities during domestic incidents involving CBRN weapons.¹⁸³

National Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs) provide assistance to state and local responders in the event of a CBRN incident. The 22 person teams have significant onsite testing capabilities and are trained to provide expert advice in case of an emergency. During Hurricane Katrina relief operations, a number of states sent their CSTs to Louisiana. Their robust communications capabilities made them very useful after Hurricane Katrina devastated the communications infrastructure along the Gulf Coast. Several teams, including the 42nd CST from North Carolina and the 54th CST from Wisconsin, deployed to Louisiana where they provided communications support to Task Force Orleans.¹⁸⁴ Other CSTs helped with the decontamination process by examining the contents of thousands of potentially hazardous containers. Working with the New Orleans Hazardous Materials Team, they conducted a thorough search of the city. The teams

¹⁸²Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹⁸³Homeland Security News Wire, "U.S. Military Trains to Support Civil Authorities During Domestic CBRN Incident," August 7, 2013, <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20130807-u-s-military-trains-to-support-civil-authorities-during-domestic-cbrn-incident> (accessed September 9, 2013).

¹⁸⁴Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*.

searched flooded areas first because the surge from the flooding moved hazardous materials from work sites to other areas. They checked every five gallon or larger container they found. They also looked for chemicals or other hazardous waste that might have been washed up by the storm. When they found a container with hazardous materials, they marked it to indicate its contents, the amount of material it contained, the date it was found, and the unit that found it. Then, they reported its location to the Environmental Protection Agency, which dispatched its personnel to dispose of the container.¹⁸⁵

Army forces provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement in support of DSCA. Providing support for domestic civilian law enforcement applies to the restricted use of Army assets to support civilian law enforcement personnel within the U.S. and its territories. These operations are significantly different from operations outside the U.S. Army forces support domestic civilian law enforcement agencies under constitutional and statutory restrictions, as prescribed by corresponding directives and regulations.¹⁸⁶ Except as expressly authorized by the Constitution of the United States or by another act of Congress, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Active Army, Air Force, and through DOD Directive 5525.5, the Marine Corps and Navy as enforcement officials to execute state or federal law and perform direct law enforcement functions.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹⁸⁷Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*, January 1986, Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Change 1, December 1989, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5525_5.pdf (accessed September 9, 2013).

However, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to state National Guard forces in state Active Duty status and Title 32 status. Nor does the Posse Comitatus Act restrict the Coast Guard, even when under the operational control of the Navy, since the Coast Guard has inherent law enforcement powers under Title 14, of the United State Code.¹⁸⁸

Intelligence activities during DSCA should be coordinated through higher headquarters for approval, in addition to consultation from a Staff Judge Advocate. Additionally, Executive Order 12333 provides guidelines for the use of military intelligence, including permitted and prohibited activities during DSCA operations.¹⁸⁹

Law enforcement support falls into two broad categories, direct and indirect support. Direct support involves enforcing the law and engaging in physical contact with offenders. Indirect support consists of aid to law enforcement agencies but not enforcement of the law or direct contact with offenders. Federal laws, presidential directives, and DOD policy restrict the use of federal military forces from enforcing laws and providing security, except on military installations. These laws, policies, and directives carefully specify exceptions to the restrictions. When authorized by the SECDEF, federal military forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement agencies, but support is limited to logistical, transportation, and training assistance except when emergency authority applies. State and territorial governors can use state National

¹⁸⁸Gene Healy, “What of ‘Posse Comitatus’?” *Akron Beacon Journal*, October 7, 2005, Cato Institute, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-posse-comitatus> (accessed September 9, 2013).

¹⁸⁹National Archives, Executive Orders 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, December 4, 1981, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html> (accessed September 9, 2013).

Guard forces for direct support of civilian law enforcement; however, such use is a temporary expedient and must be in accordance with state laws.¹⁹⁰

Congressional restrictions on domestic law enforcement activities did not inhibit in any way an expanded role for the Army in domestic relief missions. Since the Army established posts throughout the country, it was one of the few federal departments with a national presence, plus the Army's purchasing and transportation system enabled it to respond relatively quickly during times of crisis.¹⁹¹ When Hurricane Andrew ravaged the South Coast of Florida on August 24, 1992 its effects was considered the most destructive natural disaster to ever hit the U.S. The Hurricane Andrew relief mission was predominately an Active Duty mission because the 600 activated Florida National Guardsmen were quickly overwhelmed.¹⁹² Consequently, President George H.W. Bush decided to use Active Duty forces to relieve suffering in the state. JTF Andrew was established on August 28, 1992. More than 22,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 1st Corps Support Command, and other services participated in this mission. Due to the magnitude of the disasters, the Active forces were involved in providing basic lifesaving support, security, and law enforcement in the affected areas.¹⁹³ It is noteworthy to remember that under the Insurrection Act of 1807 the President has the authority to use federal troops to suppress insurrection and domestic

¹⁹⁰Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-28.

¹⁹¹Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*.

¹⁹²Ibid.

¹⁹³Ibid.

violence. Thus, the President can use Title 10 forces to perform law enforcement missions if he chooses to invoke the Insurrection Act.¹⁹⁴

Army forces provide other designated support for DSCA. Army support to national events such as Olympics, inaugurations, or state funerals are examples of providing other designated domestic support. This Army support includes preplanned, routine, and periodic support not related to disasters or emergencies. Often, this is support to major public events and consists of participatory support, special transportation, and additional security.¹⁹⁵ Some of the support provided is to augment federal and state agencies due to a shortage of work force. In special circumstances, in the interest of national security, the SECDEF as directed by the President can authorize the use of skilled soldiers to replace or augment critical enterprises. For example, President Ronald Reagan, on August 5, 1981, fired 11,000 striking Air Traffic Controllers in the Federal Aviation Administration and temporarily replaced them with military controllers until newly hired civilians completed training.¹⁹⁶

Another designated domestic support that federal or state National Guard forces receive on a regular basis is firefighting on federal, state, and local undeveloped land.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁴Legal Information Institute, “10 USC § 332.”

¹⁹⁵Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-28.

¹⁹⁶Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and the Center for Civic Education, “Domestic Policy: The Air-Traffic Controller’s Strike,” Center for Civic Education, August 1981, <http://reagan.civiced.org/lessons/domestic-policy-air-traffic-controllers-strike> (accessed September 24, 2013).

¹⁹⁷Colorado National Guard Public Affairs, “National Guard Firefighters Headed Home Soon,” The Official Homepage of the United States Army, June 20, 2013, <http://www.army.mil/article/106058/> (accessed September 24, 2013).

Another support provided by Army forces is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. In August 2013, as wildfires continued to rage around Yosemite National Park, the National Guard deployed an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to assist the site commander. The use of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle was approved by SECDEF to support firefighters.¹⁹⁸ Additionally, federal and state National Guard forces provide support to Presidential inaugurations, political conventions, and large professional sporting events such as the Super Bowl and Major League Baseball's All-Star Game.¹⁹⁹ In an article in *American Forces Press Service*, Air Force Brigadier General Jim Scanlan, with Joint Task Force National Capital Region, discussed the history and importance of military support to Presidential inaugurations.²⁰⁰ During the 2010 Super Bowl at the Miami's Sun Life Stadium, four F-15s from the Florida National Guard flew over the stadium in support of the opening ceremony.²⁰¹

Summary

In the preceding pages, the researcher introduced the key elements of the research's primary and secondary questions. The primary question begs the question; can the Army's primary logistical role in DSCA be more efficient? A more thorough review

¹⁹⁸Donna Miles, "Military Prepares to Support Super Bowl XLIV," *American Forces Press Service*, February 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=57894> (accessed September 24, 2013).

¹⁹⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-28.

²⁰⁰Tyrone Marshall Jr, "Presidential Inaugural Support Remains Vital Military Mission," *American Forces Press Service*, November 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=118471> (accessed September 24, 2013).

²⁰¹Miles, "Military Prepares to Support Super Bowl XLIV."

of the literature may reveal more answers to the above question and contribute in some part to the recommendations for the primary research question. In the following pages, the research will summarize the key takeaway from both the primary and secondary questions. In chapter 5, the researcher will make recommendations based on highlighted information from the literature review. There are a number of factors that hinder the Army's ability to deliver support in disaster relief operations. These same factors also affect the Army's ability to fulfill its primary tasks in support of DSCA. As it relates to the primary question of this research, these limiting factors also extend to inhibiting Army logistical support in DSCA.

Situational Awareness

One factor that influences Army logistic support to DSCA operations is the absence of situational awareness on the part of Active Duty forces as to what National Guard forces involved in a disaster relief area are doing. This is a problem brought on sometime due to a lack of reliable and interoperable communications, which made it extremely difficult for Army logistics to coordinate disaster relief operations. Information is critical to the ability of Army units to design and implement the many different dimensions in response to a disaster relief operation.²⁰² Information from Hurricane Katrina suggests the lack of situational awareness among the stakeholders involved in the relief efforts. The White House report on Katrina relief indicated that the lack of communication and situational awareness had a debilitating effect on the federal

²⁰²Lynn E. Davis, et al., "Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations" (Monograph, The RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center, 2007).

response. According to the report, military units and stakeholders located outside the disaster areas lacked real-time accurate situational awareness.²⁰³

Lack of situational awareness on the part of the military forces providing logistics support also extended to information about conditions on the ground. As part of this problem, there was absence of a common operating picture of what is happening and lack of knowledge of logistical assets such as relief supplies. Brigadier General Jones, JTF Pelican Commander, described a good illustration about the lack of visibility. In his report, Jones admitted that he was unaware of the presence of 15,000 people at the New Orleans Convention Center. Due to inadequate COP, the Army was not able to provide logistical support to the people stranded at the Convention Center. These people were subjected to a living hell for several days.²⁰⁴

Command and Control

Another factor that influenced Army logistic support to DSCA can be attributed to command and control, especially the command and control of logistical assets. For example, during the Hurricane Katrina relief operation the military forces in the area employed many different command and control arrangements. The National Guard troops mobilized to state Active Duty by the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi were under the command of their TAGs. The governors, through the TAGs, also had tactical control of the National Guard forces that came from other states. Due to the substantial number of National Guard forces involved in the response, Lieutenant General Blum, Chief of the

²⁰³White House, “Chapter Four: A Week of Crisis (August 29–September 5).”

²⁰⁴Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*.

National Guard Bureau, deployed a National Guard Division Headquarters to Louisiana and Mississippi to assist the TAGs in exercising operational control of the out-of-state forces.²⁰⁵

Similarly, DOD established JTF Katrina under the command of Lieutenant General Honoré for command and control of Active Duty units of the different military services. Disaster relief operations were coordinated primarily through liaison arrangements using the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. As the relief operation gained momentum, DOD leaders recommended the creation of a dual-hat command structure. However, Governor Blanco rejected the recommendation for both a dual command structure and the federalization of the National Guard. With limited coordination and synchronization efforts, Active Duty and National Guard units were assigned to different geographic areas in which to carry out various disaster relief operations. For most of the Katrina relief operation, Active Duty and National Guard units operated independently with limited harmonization conducted between the state TAGs and JTF Katrina.²⁰⁶

At best, the command and control structure that emerged from Katrina was complex and intricate. Disaster relief coordination and arrangements had to be made among states, between civilians and military organizations at both the state and federal levels, and among multiple military organizations and staffs. Both federal and state forces were commanded through separate and numerous task forces. The logistics task force, Task Force Griffin, was established and supported by units from various states. However,

²⁰⁵Ibid.

²⁰⁶Ibid.

Task Force Griffin had no direct coordination with the efforts of the Active Duty logistic elements.²⁰⁷

United States Northern Command

Another factor that limits Army logistical support to DCSA is the capability gap in NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM has completed or is in the process of revising all of the major plans it is required to prepare for its DSCA missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and conducting these missions. The problem is that NORTHCOM does not have good visibility on the status of supporting plans. Plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist NORTHCOM and that must be synchronized with NORTHCOM's plan.²⁰⁸

Other areas of concern for NORTHCOM include difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need to support DSCA. NORTHCOM has not developed the critical bridging capabilities it requires in order to better synchronize DSCA efforts with DHS or the states. All stakeholders in disaster relief operations have their own way of doing business. These differences in operating procedures often result in redundancy, supply chain bottlenecks, and reduced or excess services and supplies to disaster victims. Training and working together before the disaster can improve logistics processes and make interagency logisticians more effective in aiding disaster populations. As an example, to improve training for disaster logistics, the Army Logistics University and FEMA have collaborated to develop the Interagency Logistics Course. This course

²⁰⁷Ibid.

²⁰⁸Davis, et al., "Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations."

fills a much needed training void in disaster logistics by embedding the Whole of Government approach into a logistics based curriculum designed to train key logisticians to work together before an event takes place. FEMA is the course sponsor but this program falls outside the preview of NORTHCOM.²⁰⁹

Lieutenant General William Caldwell IV, Commanding General ARNORTH, described military disaster support he had seen from Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Caldwell, as the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division at the time Katrina made landfall, described arriving into New Orleans days after the storm and having little guidance on the division's disaster response mission.²¹⁰ As lesson learned from Katrina, Caldwell described how the development of the NRF and the interagency and military—civilian coordination, now in place, enables the DOD to offer lifesaving and life-sustaining capability to the states during relief operations. Caldwell emphasizes the importance of creating and building relations with the other stakeholders involved in DSCA. He describes how such relations were not evident during the time of Katrina relief. In his word, “It’s about forming those relationships before something happens.”²¹¹ Observation of prior DSCA missions and considerable planning is already taking place. Local Army commanders routinely interact with civilian leaders at state and local levels.

²⁰⁹Billy Davis, “Interagency Logistics Training: Perpetuating the Whole of Government Approach to Disaster Logistics,” *Army Sustainment* 42, no. 5 (September/October 2010): 30.

²¹⁰Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*.

²¹¹Lee Ezzell, “Military Leaders Refine Disaster Response Operations During Course for Nation’s Newest Dual-Status Commanders,” Army North, February 2013, <http://www.arnorth.army.mil/News/Military-leaders-refine-disaster-response-operatio.aspx> (accessed September 29, 2013).

At the federal level, national emergency planners routinely participate in military command exercises and military officers participate in FEMA sponsored exercises.²¹² What NORTHCOM is missing is this level of intercooperation exercises at the local level, where FEMA's regional offices can participate with local Army logistic organization.

In terms of requesting military forces through established procedure, combatant commanders request forces to perform specific missions. The procedure requires combatant commanders to request forces through the Joint Staff, with supporting justification. However, for NORTHCOM, this situation is somewhat more complicated than a direct request for operational forces. Any request for support from NORTHCOM is forwarded to DOD from either state or federal civilian agencies, which will entail NORTHCOM requesting forces in turn through the Joint Staff. This could result in an unwieldy bureaucratic process, in situations requiring quick response.²¹³

Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated to its plans. In the last few years, DOD has allocated forces to NORTHCOM and assigned specific forces to the command's plans, but there is no guarantee that those forces would not have to be deployed elsewhere, because of competition requirements. The availability of rapidly deployable logistics organizations that may be particularly desirable for use in DSCA may be unavailable because of overseas deployment. In addition, since National Guard forces usually live and work in the disaster affected area,

²¹²Davis, et al., "Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations."

²¹³James Russell, "NORTHCOM to Coordinate DOD Role in Homeland Defense," Strategic Insight, Center for Contemporary Conflict, May 2002.

these units may be unable to respond rapidly to DSCA support. In addition, NORTHCOM is still working through the legal constraints in the use of military forces for certain DSCA support missions. Military units providing support to disaster areas need to have a clear understanding of legal limits and procedure for DSCA.²¹⁴

Third, NORTHCOM continues to experience growing pains with the implementation of the Dual Status Command initiative. ARNORTH is taking the lead in the implementation of Dual Status Command. In February 2013, ARNORTH hosted the Dual Status Commanders Orientation Course. The event served as a forum to discuss and learn about the methods, capabilities, and services that the Active Duty forces can provide a commander. The Dual Status Command is an initiative that enables senior National Guard officers to command federal (Title 10) and state (Title 32) forces during a disaster. Each state governor can appoint a DSC for his or her state, with approval of the SECDEF. The roles and responsibilities for DSCs can differ between states and even between different disasters or emergencies.²¹⁵

Brigadier General Mike Swezey, who served as the DSC for New York during Super-storm Sandy, wrote about the need for DSCs to understand what Army capabilities are available to the states. To better implement the Dual Status Command initiative, Swezey said, “We want to make sure our state governors are informed on what ‘Title 10 activation’ means,” he continued. “It is ultimately up to the governor what Title 10 forces are used.”²¹⁶ Swezey said interagency relationships were also important, noting that a

²¹⁴Davis, et al., “Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations.”

²¹⁵Ezzell, “Dual-Status Commanders.”

²¹⁶Ibid.

state in the middle of a disaster response “is not Iraq or Afghanistan.” “The military isn’t the only solution or even the last solution; it is part of the solution.” Furthermore, Major General Charles Gailes, Commanding General operational command and control element under ARNORTH, urges DSCs to develop good practice on how to better integrate Active Duty forces into disaster relief plans. In the spirit of Dual Status Command, Gailes also challenged DSCs to consider how they would work with adjacent states in a regional response because different states have different plans. Likewise, Gailes emphasized the importance of working toward a unity of effort.²¹⁷

Finally, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of assigned military units for its DSCA mission. The difficulty arises because NORTHCOM’s plans do not specify mission tasks, against which units can be assessed. In the last 10 years, a majority of Active Duty brigade-size units have processed through the Army Force Generation Process, with little to no time to train for DSCA missions. Within the framework of the Army Force Generation Process, units conduct structured progression of readiness over time. This results in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units. These units are prepared for operational deployment in support of combatant commanders. However, within this structured readiness, units focus on only combat operations and not DSCA.

The kind of logistics support the Army might be asked to perform varies according to the amount of training required. Understanding the training implication is only the first step. NORTHCOM must review the cost and feasibility of providing DSCA training to Army logistics organizations. NORTHCOM must further consider which of

²¹⁷Ibid.

the logistic organizations is best suited to support which kinds of DSCA requirements. In addition, NORTHCOM must decide which requirement will be supported. The answer lies in examining the relative logistic capabilities within the assigned logistics organizations.

Major disasters cannot be handled without adequate preparation. The common trend in all of NORTHCOM support to DSCA has been the inadequate training for DSCA missions by military units. There is not enough time for NORTHCOM assigned units to conduct training at the site of a disaster. Effective Army logistics response to DSCA requires a commitment of time and resources by NORTHCOM, Army leadership, and Army logistics before a disaster occurs. With the ongoing drawdown of combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, NORTHCOM, the Army and the Army logistics is now poised in a unique position to start committing forces to DSCA training. As the forces apportioned to NORTHCOM continue to fill less combat mission requirements, NORTHCOM and Brigade Combat Team leadership have a responsibility to ensure that the forces are trained for their DSCA mission. This commitment has to be part of reorienting the Army and the Army logistic community. As articulated in ADRP 3-0, Army forces must be prepared to conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA operations simultaneously.²¹⁸

Federal Emergency Management Agency

The last factor that influences Army logistic support in DSCA is the posture of the lead agency for disaster relief. In accordance with the Post-Katrina Emergency

²¹⁸Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0.

Management Reform Act, FEMA leads and supports the nation in a comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. After going through different mandated reorganizations, FEMA has emerged as the agency, under the DHS, with the statutory responsibility in disaster relief operations.²¹⁹ There is no doubt that FEMA has made significant progress in enhancing its logistics capability; and based on recent initiatives, is better prepared now than at any previous time for dealing with disaster relief. Notwithstanding dramatic changes following congressionally mandated reorganization, a number of persistent issues still inhibit FEMA's ability.²²⁰

FEMA has improved its logistics capability by increasing its staff levels, boosted its training and developing programs, and enhanced coordination among federal, state, and local governments, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. As part of an improvement program, FEMA has also developed plans and exercises to improve readiness, increased its utilization of interagency agreements and contracts for needed commodities. FEMA now conducts regular meetings and teleconferences with logistics partners and created a reviewing and evaluating performance board, to examine its conduct in disaster relief operations.²²¹

However, despite progress at the federal level, corresponding improvements in many of the state and local governments have lagged behind, due to staffing and budget

²¹⁹Bea, et al., RL33729, *Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina*.

²²⁰Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, *FEMA's Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters*.

²²¹*Ibid.*

restrictions. Another difficulty is the inability of the agency's information systems to communicate directly with the systems of other disaster relief agencies, especially the Army. In addition, when a hurricane's devastation overwhelms the capacity of federal, state, and local governments, FEMA is slow to request military assistance, especially disasters that garnered little media attention.

Other significant challenges include misplaced shipments, spoiled food that had to be discarded, and wasted truckloads of ice left to melt. FEMA has not completed the development of an efficient, transparent, and flexible logistics system for procurement and delivery of goods and services necessary to respond to natural disasters, and for real-time visibility of items throughout the logistics system. As part of FEMA's attempt to improve its logistics function, the LMD was created. LMD is FEMA's major program office responsible for all aspects of logistics policy, guidance, standard, execution, and governance of logistics activities.²²² LMD now serves as the National Logistics Coordinator and is responsible for coordinating with partners in the public and private sectors, in order to strategically position initial and follow-on response resources based on anticipated requirements. LMD has not been completely successful in collaboration with its national partners to promote a truly integrated disaster logistics approach. One of the pressing issues for LMD is the absence of permanent full-time regional logisticians to plan, lead, and coordinate activities with stakeholders during disaster relief operations.²²³

Other issues currently affecting FEMA include budget constraints in the current economic condition, which hinders the ability of military, state, and local governments to

²²²Ibid.

²²³Ibid.

participate in planning and exercises. Furthermore, FEMA regional offices are responsible for coordinating with military, state, local, and tribal governments as well as channeling information between stakeholders and FEMA Headquarters. FEMA continues to rely heavily on interagency agreements to access contracts held by other federal agencies. For example, FEMA has interagency agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency for a number of items, including water and emergency meals. Lastly, FEMA's Total Asset Visibility program, which was established in 2005, has not been fully implemented. The program was designed to provide assets and in-transit visibility as well as electronic order management for all primary commodities, but the program cost has ballooned over the past years.²²⁴

²²⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

The line between disorder and order lies in logistics.
— Sun Tzu, *Art of War*

The research suggested two recommendations. The first involves creating adequate and improved situational awareness and communication among the participants in disaster relief operations. The second recommends an improvement of command and control, especially command and control of logistical assets. Imbedded in the second recommendation are the suggestions for a policy change regarding the ability to invoke the Insurrection Act and fast tracking the ongoing improvement in U.S. NORTHCOM. To the best of my knowledge and research, all the recommendations are feasible and practical.

The first recommendation confronts the factors that influence Army logistic support to DSCA operations regarding situational awareness. Active Duty forces lack situational awareness as to what involvement the National Guard forces have in the disaster relief area. This is a problem sometimes brought on due to absence of reliable and interoperable communications, which makes it extremely difficult for Army logisticians to coordinate disaster relief operations. Information is critical to the ability of Army units to design and implement the many different dimensions in response to a disaster relief operation.

The recommendation to resolve these aforementioned problems includes developing a robust communication package for disaster relief operations. By the conclusion of the Katrina relief operation, the communication network included over 25

non-military communication systems. To alleviate the problem of the lack of situational awareness, the use of non-military communication systems must be considered and incorporated into the planning process for disaster relief operations.

It is also recommended that leadership emphasis should be maintained on the ongoing communication transformation initiatives within the National Guard. For example, military leaders must continue to emphasize the importance of completing the creation of all the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, authorized by law. These teams have the capability to deploy quickly with a sophisticated communications infrastructure, capable of connecting many disparate communications systems in a very austere environment.²²⁵ As part of this recommendation, DOD must also stress the importance of deploying robust communication capability during all disaster relief operations. Finally, a comprehensive, national emergency communications strategy is needed, to confront the challenges of incorporating existing equipment and practices into a constantly changing technological and cultural environment.

The second recommendation involves considerations that would positively influence Army logistic support to DSCA operations by simplifying command and control, especially command and control of logistical assets.²²⁶ In the overall response to Hurricane Katrina, separate command structures for Active Duty and the National Guard

²²⁵National Guard Bureau, National Guard Regulation 500-3/Air National Guard Instruction 10-2503, *Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team Management* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, May 2011), http://www.ngbpd.c.ngb.army.mil/pubs/10/angi10_2503.pdf (accessed September 25, 2013).

²²⁶White House, "Chapter Five: Lessons Learned, 'Unity of Effort among Active Duty Forces and the National Guard,'" <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html> (accessed September 25, 2013).

forces hindered unity of effort. NORTHCOM commanded Active Duty forces, while each State Government commanded its National Guard forces.²²⁷ The National Guard troops mobilized to state Active Duty by the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi were under the command of their TAGs. At the same time, a National Guard Division Headquarters exercised operational control over the out-of-state forces.²²⁸ Similarly, DOD established JTF Katrina under the command of Lieutenant General Honoré for command and control of Active Duty units of the different military services.²²⁹

One recommendation to curb the problem of command and control is the implementation of a Dual Status Command role in all disaster relief operations. Although Dual Status Command has been implemented in disaster relief operations, it is not always fully implemented and it is often not incorporated into disaster relief plans. It is also recommended that to reduce the ineffectiveness of Dual Status Command, it should be applicable in all disaster relief operations. Implementing this approach will create unified command and control with a single commander in command of both Active Duty and National Guard forces. Another recommendation is for the President to invoke the Insurrection Act in instances of disaster relief where a large number of military forces will be required. In addition, invoking the Insurrection Act will allow DOD to provide more robust logistics support to disaster areas quicker. The Act will also temporarily lift the restriction on Active Duty forces conducting domestic law enforcement duties. It is

²²⁷Davis, et al., “Hurricane Katrina Lessons for Army Planning and Operations.”

²²⁸Wombwell, *Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster*.

²²⁹Duke, “The Category 5 General.”

recommended that by invoking the Insurrection Act, all military forces and assets can be brought to bear quickly under a single command and control structure.

Another recommendation is to fill the capability gap in NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM has completed or is in the process of revising all of the major plans it requires to prepare for its DSCA missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and conducting these missions. The recommendation is for NORTHCOM to improve its visibility on the status of supporting plans; supporting plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist NORTHCOM; and that must be synchronized with NORTHCOM's plan. Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its homeland defense, civil support plans, and operations with other federal agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and procedures. Procedures such as memorandums of understanding or charters to help ensure that interagency coordination efforts and agreements that are reached can be fully relied upon.

Another recommendation concerns NORTHCOM's difficulty in identifying requirements for capabilities it may need to support DSCA. The recommendation is for NORTHCOM to develop the critical bridging capabilities it requires in order to better synchronize its DSCA efforts with DHS or the states. It is also recommended that NORTHCOM better develop its capability, connect that capability with allocated forces, and synchronize both with the DSCA plans. NORTHCOM must also take additional actions to reduce the risk from personnel and capability gaps and reduce the risk due to the overall uncertainty that stems from the nature of an unpredictable DSCA mission. Finally, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of assigned military units for its DSCA mission. One recommendation is for NORTHCOM to develop its DSCA

plans to specify mission tasks against which units can be assessed. To assist NORTHCOM in the monitoring of the readiness of its assigned units, NORTHCOM must mandate periodical unit readiness status on DSCA tasks. NORTHCOM should also deploy Training and Certification Teams to the units to validate the units DSCA training. Additionally, NORTHCOM should develop a DSCA specific Mission Readiness Exercise, which includes other DSCA stakeholders. The Mission Readiness Exercise will allow assigned units to confirm their assumptions and facts, and NORTHCOM to validate the unit's training.

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